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THE INFORMER PRIVILEGE
MELVIN GUTTERMAN
The author is a 1962 graduate of Brooklyn Law School, where he served as Editor-in-Chief of the
Law Review. In February of 1965, Mr. Gutterman was awarded a Police Legal Advisor Fellowship at
Northwestern University School of Law and, after a year's residence at the law school, served as an
intern police legal advisor to the Oakland, California police department until November 1, 1966 when
he became associated with the Institute for Community Development ci Michigan State Univer-
sity.
The article, which was submitted by Mr. Gutterman in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the LL.M. degree at Northwestern, sets forth the utility of informers to police work, particularly in the
vice control area. He also collects and analyzes the decisional law of the federal and state courts which
have wrestled with the vexing problem of when, and under what circumstances, a defendant is en-
titled to know the identity of an informant who has played some role in the case against him. Publi-
cation of Mr. Gutterman's article in this issue is especially timely since the Supreme Court of the
United States may undertake a re-examination of this entire body of law in McCray v. Illinois,
384 U.S. 949 (1966), now pending in that Court.
Law enforcement agencies, in their efforts to
combat crime, oftentimes must rely heavily upon
statements of secret informers. The communica-
tions from informers have proven vital to the de-
tection of criminal activities.' The information re-
ceived may expose a crime, or be used as a basis for
an arrest or search. Such information at times may
prompt an investigation, and eventually sufficient
information may be gathered to prosecute a
criminal action.
To encourage this type of communication to
law enforcement agencies, it is often deemed
necessary to suppress the identity of the informer.
The informer does not wish to expose himself be-
cause of fear of physical harm to himself and his
family. This very real danger is well illustrated by
the murder of Arnold Schuster. The New York
Police publicly disclosed that it was Schuster's
identification that led to the arrest of bank robber
Willie Sutton. A few days later, Schuster was
mysteriously slain.2 In addition, the informant
may also be subjected to diverse social reactions as
well as civil action.3
The government also has an interest in nondis-
closure. It is not enough to declare that it is the
obligation of citizens to communicate their
knowledge of the commission of crimes to law en-
I VoLLmER, TE POLICE IN MODERN SOCIETY (1936).
2 N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1952, p. 1, col. 2, id. March 9,
1952, p. 1, col. 8.
" Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884); Elrod v. Moss,
278 Fed. 123 (4th Cir. 1921); Worthington v. Scribner,
109 Mass. 487 (1872).
forcement officers; many individuals will still re-
main reluctant to give this information unless they
are assured of anonymity. By preserving their
identity, the continued value of the individual in-
former to the police is protected. It also encourages
other persons to cooperate in the administration
of justice.
The judiciary, in its effort to preserve the public
interest in facilitating the use of informers, has
developed the so-called evidentiary rule-the in-
former's privilege. But the informer's privilege is,
in reality, no more than the government's privi-
lege to withhold from disclosure the identity of
persons who furnish information of violations of
crime.4
The privilege of withholding disclosure of an
informer's identity is not absolute. As to the ques-
tion when the privilege of nondisclosure applies
and when exception should be made, and disclosure
required, no fixed rule is justifiable.5 The problem
is one that calls for balancing the public interest in
protecting the flow of information against the
fundamental principle that an individual accused
of a crime is entitled to a full and fair opportunity
to defend himself. Where, in a particular case, the
balance is to be drawn has become an ever increas-
ing and vexatious problem to the courts.
This article will first describe the police practice
in the use of their informants. It will then analyze
the informer privilege at both the federal and state
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).1 Ibid.
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level, with a view toward determining where the
balance is to be drawn.
POLICE PROCEDURE IN THE USE OF
INFORMANTS
The cooperation of individuals who can furnish
accurate information to the police is necessary if
law enforcement agencies are to discharge their
obligations. Generally, an informant is the person
who voluntarily gives this information to the
police.'
Informants include persons from varied occupa-
tions, ages, and neighborhoods. Many persons, be-
cause of their occupations, are in a good position
to supply the police with valuable information:
For instance, hotel bellboys, doormen and
switchboard operators are aware of the activi-
ties of guests. Doctors, dentists and nurses
may have knowledge of a suspect's injuries.
Dance hall and pool hall operators usually
have information about their patrons. Taxi-
cab drivers, bus drivers and railroad employees
have an opportunity to observe their passen-
gers. Garagemen and parking lot attendants
can supply information about the condition of
a car. Janitors and building managers know
what goes on in their buildings. Public utility
employees have an opportunity to observe
things in the buildings they enter. Barbers
listen a great deal and become informed from
the many conversations with their customers.7
The considerations that may motivate a person
to cooperate with the police are legion. Some of the
more prevalent motives are fear, avoidance of
punishment, jealousy, revenge, competition, ego-
tism or vanity, gain, repentence, remuneration,
and civic-mindedness. The informant's motive is
of value to the police, of course, in evaluating the
reliability of the information received. 8
The Chicago Police Department classifies in-
formants into nine general types, depending upon
the informer's motive for revealing information. 9
1. The Anonynwus Informant. He may be a
telephone caller or letter writer. The Gambling
Unit of the Vice Control Division average six
anonymous telephone calls a week, and approxi-
mately twice as many anonymous letters. Informa-
6 Investigator's Notebook, Chicago Police Depart-




tion from the anonymous informant is always
treated as potentially valuable.' 0
2. The Self-Aggrandizing Informant. This per-
son, who usually has contacts among the under-
world, delights in giving information to gain favor
from the police. The informant's ego is enhanced
by magnifying his importance in the disclosed
operation.
3. The Legitimte Informant. He is the law-
abiding operator of a legitimate business who has
an opportunity to observe the criminally prone in
his everyday transactions.
The Licensing Unit of the Vice Control Division
obtains accurate information about criminal
activity from owners of lounges and taverns.
These establishments' entertainment and liquor
licenses are subject to suspension and revocation,
and thus the legitimate owner tries to prevent his
place of business from becoming a hangout for the
criminal element."
4. The Woman Informant. She may be a girl
friend of a criminal or the wife of a gambling hus-
band. Her motive for informing is generally emo-
tional.
5. The Frightened Informant. This type of in-
formant usually fears that he will be placed in a
dangerous situation through some criminal act of
his associates. He fears his own well-being and pro-
vides information as a means of protection.
6. The Rival Informant. He is one who earns a
living by questionable means and wishes, by
informing, to eliminate his competitor.
7. The Mercenary Informant. He informs for
money or for some other material gain. Also, he
may seek revenge as well as profit for his revelation.
The monetary consideration paid by the
Gambling and Narcotics Units range from ten to
twenty-five dollars, depending upon the value of
the information.
The Narcotics Unit retains receipts for all
monies given to the informer. The informer's card
(indexed according to assigned number) contains
the amount of money given, the raid number, and
the prior cases in which the informant has rendered
assistance. The name of the informer, and his as-
signed number are kept on separate cards, in a
secure place, and is available to limited personnel
only.
10 Interviews With Unit Lieutenants of Gambling,
Narcotics, Prostitution and Licensing Units of the
Chicago Vice Control Division, in Chicago, September
& October, 1965.
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The Gambling Unit is quite cautious about its
payments to informants, because through experi-
ence, they have learned that their informers have at
times worked both sides-receiving money from
the police for information about a gambling opera-
tion, and from the policy operator for information
about a potential raid. No money is paid by the
unit until the information has proved reliable.12
8. The False Informant. His falsity is due to
"dreamed up" information. Sometimes his purpose
may be the desire to appear on the side of the
police in order that suspicion will not be focused
on him.
9. The Double-Crosser Informant. He usually
wants to talk to the police to get more information
than he is going to give in return.
The general type may include female or juvenile
informants. The Chicago Police Department,
recognizing a potential hazard in the officer's
dealings with these informants, issues a special
warning:
If the investigator comes in contact with a
juvenile informant, he should consult the
juvenile officer and the parents of the juvenile
to avoid any possibility for a complaint to be
made that the juvenile was abused or taken
advantage of. Female informants may be in-
valuable sources of information, but certain
dangers are present. An emotional motive is
usually the cause for a female to turn inform-
ant. Females often know men and are quick
to recognize their weaknesses. In a case where
a protracted association with a female inform-
ant is necessary, a definite danger exists for
the investigator. If not extremely careful, the
investigator may allow himself to be diverted
into side excursions with the female in-
formant.13
The ability of the investigator to obtain and
hold on to a reliable informant depends on many
considerations. One of the most important is the
reputation of the investigator, and the police de-
partment, for integrity and fair dealing.14 The
department stresses that the investigator should
never make a promise that he cannot fulfill, or has
no intention of delivering. Generally, the only
representation that is made to the informant hav-
12 Interviews.
12 Investigator's Notebook, Chicago Police Depart-
ment, August 21, 1961.14 IARNEY & CzOss, THE ImoxmER rN LAW EN-
FoRcEMENT 52, (1960).
ing a pending criminal case is that his cooperation
will be brought to the prosecutor's attention.15
A most compelling deterrent against informing
is the sinister connotation of the word itself. The
informant resents being referred to as squealer,
stoolie, rat, stool pigeon, squawker, or in similar
terms. Investigatory agencies now take a more in-
telligent, objective, and professional attitude
toward the informant. "They no longer refer to
'stool pigeons' in official reports. 'Informer' is the
strongest derogatory word.... [They] substitute
words like 'source' or 'complainant' or 'special
employee' or some more euphemistic term."' 6
Each investigatory unit employs a different
operating procedure in the use of informants. The
unit commander's preference is determined by the
unit's experience in dealing with informants and
the legal restrictions applicable to his department.
The Narcotics Unit uses three basic methods:
1. The informant may be used in a "controlled
buy." The officer conducts a complete "strip
search" of the informant's person and clothing.
Once it is established that the informant does not
possess narcotics, he is handed marked money, and
is immediately transported by the agents to the
location of the buy. If possible, the agents secure a
concealed position to observe the transaction.
Upon completion of the transaction, the peddler
is arrested, and the marked money and other
contraband taken from his possession. The nar-
cotics are recovered from the informant, establish-
ing the fact that the informant obtained the nar-
cotics from the person arrested for making the sale.
2. The informant may provide the entree to a
narcotics operation. The narcotics peddler often
will not deal with outsiders. The informant, usually
an addict himself, makes the initial introduction of
the undercover agent to the peddler, passing him
off as a fellow addict or a potential one. Acceptance
of the undercover agent is primarily predicated upon
the informant's relationship with the peddler.
Once accepted, the agent attempts to gain the
peddler's confidence, and endeavors to work him-
self into the heirarchy of the organization. His
success depends on many factors; the size of the
operation, the organization's procedure, the
officer's experience and capability, and the money
available to sustain the operation. The money and
time necessary for an extensive investigation often
prohibits the Narcotics Unit from engaging in this
is Interviews; Investigator's Notebook, Chicago Po-
lice Department, August 21, 1961.
16 HANEY & CRoss, op. cit. supra note 14, at 55.
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type of operation. Because of the cost factor, this
procedure is used primarily by the federal au-
thorities.
3. The informant is most commonly used in ob-
taining a search warrant. The informant advises
the investigator that he has visited the home, room
or apartment, of a person trafficking in narcotics,
where he observed contraband on the premises; he
specifies the contraband and its location on the
premises. The investigator surveys the described
place, with a special interest in the entrance and
exit of known narcotics users. By further investi-
gation the officer seeks the identity of the occu-
pants of the premises, their criminal record, and
possible unexecuted arrest warrants.
Once satisfied that the surveillance and investi-
gation has yielded all attainable information, the
officer determines the type of complaint to be used
in obtaining the search warrant. Most often the
informant is surreptitiously brought before a
magistrate, the informant and officer swearing to
the truth of the facts in the complaint. The com-
plaint, drawn by the officer, states the informant's
observations, his visits to the premises, and the
officer's own personal observations as a result of
the investigation. The informant is almost always
given a fictitious name to protect his identity.
On some occasions the officer is the sole swearing
party to the complaint, affirming all the facts un-
covered by the investigation, including the in-
formant's initial statement. The complaint for
"hearsay warrants" will describe prior events
which lead to the conclusion that the informer is
reliable.
The Narcotics Unit takes every precaution to
avoid entrapment, and the appearance of entrap-
ment, by the informant. The department has issued
a pertinent warning:
When using an informant, it is possible that
the informant through ignorance, some ulte-
rior motive, or greediness might scheme or
heedlessly entrap into crime a person, who
has no intention of committing a crime, and
who was motivated to this crime by the in-
formant, who becomes the instrumentality of
the law. The danger can be avoided by an
investigator who uses a degree of wariness
and intelligence in the handling of the in-
formant.1
-1 Investigator's Notebook, Chicago Police Depart-
ment, August 21, 1961. See HARNEY & CRoss, op. ci.
supra note 14, at 53.
There is another special risk noted.in the han-
dling of informants in narcotics cases. That is in
connection with the informer who is addicted:
Some of these people will importune the
investigating officer for a ration of narcotics
"to keep going" until they help us make a
case. Any officer who accedes to this request
jeopardizes his reputation and his job, and
becomes a dope peddler, subject to imprison-
ment in the penitentiary. ... In passing, it
should be said that if the system of any nar-
cotic law enforcement agency is such as to
permit accessibility to drugs to supply an
addict, that system should be corrected, as.
the organization may be on the verge of
disaster. 8
Not peculiar to narcotics, but certainly appli-
cable, is the danger that minor illegal conduct by
the informant may be overlooked by the investi-
gator because of the informant's value and re-
liability. "The fact that a person is an informant
for an investigator, must not be a license for him
to engage in illegal misconduct. The greatest
dangers of any compromise with crime are the
possibility they will result in disgrace to the law
enforcement agency, a distorted .perspective,
create a privileged class of petty criminals, and
lead to faulty judgment."' 9
The Prostitution Unit uses informants in a more
restrictive manner. After receiving information,
which may be from any of the sources previously
enumerated, that premises are being used for the
purpose of prostitution, a surveillance is estab-
lished. Once satisfied that the information is accu-
rate, the investigator will question male patrons
exiting from the premises. The investigator basi-
cally seeks the "contact name" necessary to secure
an appointment with the girl. Once the informant
reveals the "contact name" an appointment is ob-
tained, and the girl is arrested if the subsequent
facts make out a violation of the prostitution laws.
If the surveillance indicates that the operation
is controlled by an outside source-who sends
patrons to the girl, a slightly different procedure
is employed. The officer will stop :patrons from
entering the premises and engage their assistance.
The officer borrows the informant's identification,
and by the use of this identification gains entrance
to the premises. Once in the premises, and under
'
8 HARNEY & CRoss, op. cit. Supra note 14, at 54.19 Investigator's Notebook, Chicago Police Depart-
ment, August 21, 1961.
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the assumed personality, the officer independently
establishes the elements constituting the offense
of prostitution. Very often the patron or arrested
girl will reveal the identity of the outside party.
Other information is usually obtained as a result
of the initial arrest. The patron may supply the
officer with a list of additional prostitutes. A
search of the premises often produces a "trick
book," which contains the names of the girl's
patrons. The "trick book" is a valuable tool for the
investigator. By contacting the individuals listed
he is able to persuade these individuals to reveal
the identity, location and "contact name" of
prostitutes he has patronized or knows.
The Gambling Unit basically uses the informant
in obtaining search warrants. The informant ad-
vises the investigator that a wire room is operating
on certain premises. At the investigator's direction,
the informant telephones the given number and
places a bet, while the investigator listens to the
conversation on an extension phone. 2° The telephone
number is checked for location, and a surveillance
is established. After the surveillance is completed a
search warrant is obtained. The complaint for the
search warrant, which is affirmed only by the
officer, states that the officer received information
from a "reliable informant," citing the information,
the placed bet, and the results of the surveillance.
The warrant is executed promptly to avoid a pos-
sible leak or shut-down of the wire room.
As previously stated, information received from
informers provides not only the basis for an arrest,
but also the impetus for police investigation. The
outlined police techniques are only a few of the
more widely used methods that a law enforcement
agency may employ in the use of informers. The
effective law enforcement agency clearly recog-
nizes that the informant is extremely useful, if not
absolutely essential, to their department.
THE EXTENT OF THE PRIVILEGE IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
There is no fixed rule in balancing of the public
interest in the use of informers against the indi-
vidual's right to defend himself. In an early
English case, Lord Esher suggested:
20There is a possibility that this procedure may be
lost by virtue of a recent Illinois Supreme Court deci-
sion, People v. Kurth, 34 Ill. 2d 387, 216 N.E.2d 154
(1966), which construed the Illinois eavesdropping stat-
ute as meaning that any party who has not consented
to a recording or transmission of his conversation may
bar its admission as evidence against him.
[I]f upon the trial of a prisoner the judge
should be of the opinion that the disclosure of
the name of the informant is necessary or
right in order to show the prisoner's innocence,
then one public policy is in conflict with an-
other public policy, and that which says that
an innocent man is not to be condemned when
his innocence can be proved is the policy that
must prevail.2'
In the federal jurisdiction it was slowly recog-
nized that fundamental requirements of fairness
may require disclosure. Where the informer was
not simply a "tipster" who aroused the police
officer to a crime that was committed, or about to
be committed, but, on the contrary, played an
active part in the actual commission of the crime,
the courts began to hold that the informer became
a material witness and vital to the defense of the
case.
This informer participant theory is well illus-
trated by United States v. Conforti.n In Conforti,
it was alleged that on several occasions the de-
fendant had passed counterfeit money to a govern-
ment informer, and that the transactions had been
witnessed by police officers. On appeal, the de-
fendant contended that the trial court erred in
permitting testimony to be offered of his conversa-
tions with the government informers without
requiring disclosure of their identity. The court
ruled that the defendant would have been entitled
to know the identity of the informer who was
alleged to have received the counterfeit money if
proper inquiry had been made:n
[He] was more than a mere informer. He was
not simply an individual who, knowing that
the defendant had committed or was about to
commit a crime, communicated that knowl-
edge to the authorities so that the police,
acting independently, might then procure
evidence of the crime. On the contrary, ... [he]
played a part with the defendant in the very
transaction upon which the Government relies
to prove its case.u
21 Marks v. Beyfus, 25 Q.B.D. 494, 498 (1890).
- 200 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
925 (1952).
n The court, although holding the defendant was
entitled to be given the identity of the informer who
received the currency, ruled that nondisclosure of such
identity did not require a reversal in view of the fact
that there was no showing that the defendant ever made
a demand for the informer's name. See note 42 infra. and
accompanying text.
24 200 F.2d at 367.
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In 1955, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit made it clear that there was a distinction
between the case where the person called the in-
former is that and nothing more, in which case the
defendant would not have been entitled to have
his identity disclosed, and a case... where the
informer is the person to whom the defendant is
said to have sold and dispensed the opium de-
scribed in the indictment. In such a case informa-
tion as to the person's identity was material to the
defense, and the denial of the requested informa-
tion was error.22
In 1957, the Supreme Court, in Roviaro v. United
States,26 justice Clark dissenting, ruled that the
district court had committed reversible error by
permitting the Government to withhold disclosure
of the identity of the informer, where the informer,
an undercover government employee, had taken a
material part in bringing about the defendant's
possession. It is interesting to note that the
defendant in Roviaro was convicted on two counts,
sale of narcotics to the undisclosed informer, and
possession of narcotics. The Government, before
the Supreme Court, did not defend the first count,
which charged a sale. The Court indicated, in a
footnote, that the district court erred in denying
the petitioner's motion for the identity and address
of the informer prior to trial.
27
The information elicited from an informer may
be relevant and helpful to the defense even though
the informer is not a participant in the offense. The
importance of informer testimony in nonpartici-
pant type crimes is clearly illustrated by an old
English case Regina v. Richardson,21 where the de-
fendant was indicted for administering poison with
intent to murder. The police, through information
furnished to them by informers, found a bottle
of poison in a place used only by the defendant.
The informers were not called as witnesses and the
court held that their disclosure was material to the
ends of justice. The court pointed out that such
witnesses could have stated how it was that they
had come to know where the bottle of poison was to
be found and perhaps could have given some clue
as to the person who had put it there.
The Supreme Court's language in Roviaro would
seem to indicate that disclosure may not be limited
to those cases where the informer is a participant.
25 Portomene v. United states, 221 F.2d 582, 583 (5th
Cir. 1955).
26 353 U.S. 53 (1957).27 Id. at 65 n. 15.
28 176 Eng. Reprint 318 (1863).
The Court ruled that there was no fixed rule with
respect to disclosure:
Whether a proper balance renders nondis-
closure erroneous must depend on the particu-
lar circumstances of each case, taking into
consideration the crime charged, the possible
defenses, the possible significance of the in-
former's testimony, and other relevant fac-
tors.29
This language would indicate that the fact the
informer is a participant in the crime charged
would be only one relevant factor and disclosure
would be required even where the informer did not
actually participate if the "contents of his com-
munication, is relevant and helpful to the defense
of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination
of a cause." 30 For this latter proposition the Court
in Roviaro not only cited Scher v. United States"
and Wilson v. United States- but also the early
English case of Regina v. Richardson. At this time,
it is interesting to note that both Scher and Wilson
are requests for disclosure of the informant to test
probable cause; in Scher for the arrest, in Wilson
for the search.-"
In cases subsequent to Roviaro, the federal
Courts of Appeal have emphasized varying por-
tions of that opinion in formulating rules for their
particular circuits. A limited number of courts have
applied participant informer criteria to probable
cause type informer cases, thus greatly diminishing
the dictum impact of Roviaro.34 Other circuits ap-
pear to have limited Roviaro to prosecutions where
entrapment is the defense,35 and even in those
353 U.S. at 62.
30 Id. at 60, 61.31305 U.S. 251 (1938).
59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932). In Wilson, the court
enunciated the rule that "if what is asked is useful evi-
dence to vindicate the innocence of the accused or lessen
the risk of false testimony or is essential to the proper
disposition of the case, disclosure will be compelled." 59
F.2d at 392.
"' See infra notes 68 through 99 and accompanying
text for necessity of disclosure in probable cause situa-
tions.T
4Jones v. United States, 326 F.2d 124 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 956 (1964); United States
v. Whiting, 311 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 935 (1963); Williams v. United States, 273
F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951
(1960); Pegram v. United States, 267 F.2d 781 (6th Cir.
1959).
35 United States v. Simonetti, 326 F.2d 614 (2d Cir.
1964); United States v. Collier, 313 F.2d 157 (7th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 844 (1963); Mosco v. United
States, 301 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 842 (1962); United States v. Clarke, 220 F.Supp.
905 (E.D. Penn. 1963).
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prosecutions it has been held that disclosure of
the informer is not absolute.n The majority of the
courts have, however, limited Roviaro to informers
who have participated in the offense.37
Recently, the Supreme Court was asked to
decide whether it was necessary to limit disclosure
to a participant informer. In Rugendorf v. United
States,38 the defendant was convicted of knowingly
receiving, concealing, and storing stolen furs
which had been transported in interstate com-
merce. The stolen furs were found in the basement
of the defendant's home pursuant to a search war-
rant based partly on information from confidential
informants. Justice Clark, expressing the views of
five members of the Court, held that the defend-
ant's claim to disclosure by the Government of the
identity of the government's informers was not
maintainable because it was not properly raised in
the trial court nor passed upon there.3 9 justice
Douglas, speaking for the minority, concluded
that the defendant's trial court statement alleging
that he needed the identity of the informant for
his defense, was sufficient to raise the issue of
whether the information was so essential to the
defense as to outweigh the public interest involved
in protecting the informant's identity.40
If the Court in Rugendorf had reached the merits
of the defendant's contention, it might have been
forced to recognize that the informant's identity
was essential to a proper defense. The defendant
asserted that he was unaware of the presence of the
furs in his basement. He produced evidence that
36 Firo v. United States, 340 F.2d 597 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 929 (1965); United States v. Fredia, 319
F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1963); Mosco v. United States, supra
note 35.
37 United States v. D'Angiolillo, 340 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 955 (1965); United States
v. Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 933 (1964); United States, ex. rd. Drew v.
Meyers, 327 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1964), cart. de died, 379
U.S. 847 (1964); Williams v. United States, supra note
34; Miller v. United States, 273 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 928 (1960); Pegram v.
United States, supra note 34; Gilmore v. United States,
256 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1958).
38 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
19Th defendant also sought the identity of the in-
formants in order to establish the lack of probable cause
upon which the search warrant had been issued. The
Court concluded that adequate probable cause existed
from other circumstantial evidence and held that the
informer's identity was privileged. See note 93 infra
and accompanying text for further discussion of the
"probable cause" problem in Rugendorf.
10 The majority further held that they could not
decide the question of necessity of disclosure because the
defendant failed to develop the criteria necessitating
such disclosure.
for a period between February 17 until March 4,
he was out of town. During this period four per-
sons possessed keys to his home, including a
brother who was an acknowledged fence for stolen
goods. The search occurred on March 22 and both
the defendant and his wife testified that they had
not entered the basement since their return on
March 4.
In order to establish that he had no knowledge
that the furs were concealed in his home, it would
seem essential that the defendant obtain informa-
tion concerning the identity of the individual who
placed the furs in the basement, his reason for
doing so, and his relationship, if any, to the de-
fendant. There was a strong possibility that the
informant who supplied the information to the
officers could have also furnished this information
for the defendant to establish his defense. It must
be stressed that it is not clear whether the in-
former was a participant in the crime; however, it
is clear that the informer's testimony might have
shed light on the guilt or innocence of the defend-
ant even if the informant had not been a par-
ticipant.4'
Circumventing Disclosure
Since there is a strong desire by the courts to
preserve the identity of the informer, disclosure
will not be required, even where the informer is a
participant in the crime, unless the record clearly
indicates that a demand was made for the informa-
tion. This is again clearly illustrated in the Con-
forti decision,4 where the court, although holding
that the defendant was entitled to be given the
identity of the informer, ruled that nondisclosure
did not require a reversal of the conviction in view
of the fact that there was no showing that any
demand for disclosure was made. And, as stated
previously, the majority of the Court in Rugendorf
ruled that the defendant's claim for disclosure of
the informer was not maintainable because it was
improperly raised on trial.4
A leading qualification of the informer privilege
is that "once the identity of the informer has been
disclosed to those who could have cause to resent
41 See Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330
P.2d 39 (1958); People v. McSharm, 50 Cal. 2d 802, 330
P.2d 33 (1958).
12 United States v. Conforti, supra note 22. Accord,
United States v. Colletti, 245 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 874 (1957); Cannon v. United
States, 158 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330
U.S. 839 (1946).
11 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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the communication, the privilege is no longer
applicable." 44 This ruling apparently means that
in an appropriate case, in which the defendant has
learned the identity of the informer from some
other source, he is entitled to have the informant
disclosed in open court. Of course, the accused can
never be absolutely sure that he knows the inform-
ant, unless the informant is definitely identified
in court. And conceivably, even when the de-
fendant knows the identity of the informer, public
disclosure may still be against the public interest.
However, this qualification is greatly diminished
by the rulings that error in failing to require dis-
closure is ordinarily not prejudicial where the
identity of the informer is known to the accused.4
Thus in Sorrei tino v. United States,46 the court,
although agreeing that disclosure was necessary,
ruled that the error in failing to require disclosure
was harmless, since the identity of the informer was
disclosed by the testimony of another government
witness.
In this connection, it should be noted that in
Rozdaro, Justice Clark dissented on the very
ground that the informer was well known to the
defendant, and consequently, he could not have
been prejudiced by the nondisclosure.47 The
majority in Roviaro gave tacit approval to the
rule that if the defendant knew the identity of the
informant, nondisclosure would not be prejudicial.
The majority commented that no factual findings
were made by the trial court that the accused
knew the informer's identity, and therefore, they
would not assume that the informer's identity was
known.48
There is authority, however, that nondisclosure
is not made harmless because the defendant knew
the name of the informer. In Portoene v. United
States,4' the defendant and another woman testified
11 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. at 60.45 United States v. Conforti, supra note 22;
Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627 (9th Cir.
1947). An accused's knowledge of the identity of the
informer may be a factor relied upon in support of sus-
taining the privilege of nondisclosure. Smith v. United
States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 846 (1959).
46 163 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947).
47 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (Clark, J., dissenting.)4 1 Id. at 60 n. 8. In fact, one of the police officers
testified that the informer at police headquarters denied
knowing or ever having seen the accused.
An interesting question is, upon whom does the bur-
den rest to show lack of knowledge of the informer's
identity? See De Losa v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App.
2d 1, 332 P.2d 390 (1958).
49 221 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1955).
that they were of the opinion that they knew the
informer, and that there was bad blood between
the defendant and the informer because of the
defendant's relationship to her. The defendant's
relationship to the woman was advanced as the
motive for the informer desiring to involve the de-
fendant with the false charges that he dealt in
narcotics. The Portomene court discussed the
Ninth Circuit Sorrentino opinion,58 and the
Seventh Circuit Conforti decision," but rejected
their theory for the Fifth Circuit, explicitly hold-
ing that it was prejudicial error not to disclose the
informer's identity to the accused:
We do not think this will at all do. [Refer-
ring to Sorrentino and Conforti] Who can say
whether, deprived of the information to which
he was entitled, the defendant in his lame
and halting efforts to extricate himself from the
situation in which the refusal to name the
informer had placed him, did not greatly
prejudice his defense by offering testimony
which the jury may have throught was ad-
duced to set up a straw man simply to knock
him down?"2
Inapplicability of Informer Privilege
Once disclosure is required, the Government
must either reveal the identity of the informer to
the defendant or drop its prosecution." After
naming the informant, the Government's further
duty is not clear.
The Ninth Circuit, in Eberhart v. United States,5'
reasoned that once identified, "the failure of the
Government to produce an informer or other
person as witness does not violate the defendant's
rights."' This appears to be the prevailing rule in
the federal circuits that have been confronted with
this problem.5 However, in United States v.
"0 Sorrentino v. United States, supra note 45.
"1 United States v. Conforti, 200 F.2d 365 (7th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1952).
52221 F.2d at 584. Cf. Firo v. United States, 340 F.2d
597 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 929 (1965).
"Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). But
cf. Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d
39 (1958). See also United States v. Keown, 19 F.Supp.
639 (W.D. Ky. 1937).
"262 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1958).
5" Id. at 422.
56 Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951 (1960); Smith v. United
States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 846 (1960); Eberhart v. United States, 262 F.2d
421 (9th Cir. 1948); Dear Check Quong v. United
States, 160 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
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Clarke,57 the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, in a prosecution for
conspiracy and sale of narcotics without written
orders, held that the defendant's trial was unfair
because of the absence of an identified informer
who was the sole participant in all but one of five
alleged sales, and who was the only person, aside
from the defendant, who could have shed light on
the defense of entrapment. The informer's absence
without satisfactory explanation, the court held,
necessitated a new trial. The court stated that
"common fairness made it the Government's duty
to produce [the informer] at the trial, or, failing
that, to show that reasonable efforts to produce him
were fruitless."581 And in United States v. Rosario,59
the Second Circuit inferentially supported the
proposition that there may be cases where the
Government would be under a duty to produce the
informer, if it is able to do so.
Although it would appear that generally the
Government may not be required to produce the
informer or to call him as a witness, information
sufficient to enable the defense to locate the in-
former must be given if the Government has it.
This proposition is supported by the Second
Circuit's opinion in United States v. D'Angiolillo,60
the court reasoning that the defense is entitled not
only to the informer's name, but to other informa-
tion concerning his whereabouts, and to reasonable
cooperation in securing his appearance. The court,
however, affirmed the defendant's conviction,
stressing that not only was the informer's identity
revealed, but that he was readily available to
subpoena, since he was confined in a federal
penitentiary. Moreover, the judge offered to sub-
poena the informer and afford defense counsel an
opportunity to confer with him privately and to
call him as a defense witness and to question him
as a hostile witness if he proved to be one.
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Collier,"'
reversed a conviction for a violation of the narcotics
laws, where the defense was entrapment, holding
that the trial court should have persisted in deter-
mining whether the Government knew where the
informer was or would be, and whether they could
find out where he was. And the Eighth Circuit, in
57 220 F.Supp. 905 (E.D. Penn. 1963).
Is Id. at 908.
5 327 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1964).
60340 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
955 (1965).
61313 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
844 (1963).
White v. United States,62 inferentially supports the
proposition that if the name of the informant is to
be disclosed, all reasonable efforts to locate him
must be made by the prosecution.
A question not yet decided is whether the
Government is under a duty to make a good faith
effort to inform itself of the names and addresses
of its informers. Or can it effectively avoid dis-
closure by merely making no attempt to learn the
facts? In United States v. Oropoza,6 the Seventh
Circuit, on its own motion, raised this precise
question but then stated that it need not face that
issue in the case before it.4 The same circuit again
alluded to this problem in United States v. Pruitt,6 5
in discussing the defendant's contention that the
identity of the informant must include sufficient
information for service of a subpoena and that
"the Government must have a duty to retain
control over its special employees, or to prove
that it has made good faith efforts to obtain
specific information about their names, addresses
and whereabouts." 6 6 The court held that the
Government had satisfied its duty where it
furnished the accused with the last known address
of the informant, who was also known to the
accused, and had made an unsuccessful search for
the informer, giving the defense full disclosure of
all known information.
It would seem that once disclosure is required
some good faith on the part of the prosecution
must prevail. The Government should not refrain
from disclosing the informer's identity until he
ceases to be available as a witness, nor should the
Government procure the removal of the informer
from the jurisdiction.17
The Informer and Probable Cause
In the landmark case of Weeks v. United States,6 8
the Supreme Court, in exercising its supervisory
powers over the federal courts, held that in a
federal prosecution, the fourth amendment barred
6 330 F.2d 811 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
855 (1964).
275 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1960).
The court indicated that "the answer must be
resolved within the standards set out in the Roviaro
case." Id. at 561. The court was apparently referring to
the "balancing test" in Roviaro.
65 331. F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
884 (1964).16 Id. at 235.
17 See People v. Kiihoa, 53 Cal. 2d 748, 349 P.2d 673
(1960); People v. Wilson, 24 Ill. 2d 425, 182 N.E. 2d
203 (1962).
68 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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the use of evidence secured through an illegal
search and seizure. It was not until 1961, in Mapp
v. Ohio, 9 that the Supreme Court held exclusion
to be an essential ingredient of the core of fourth
amendment rights, thus rendering evidence ob-
tained through an unreasonable search and seizure
inadmissible in state courts.
A federal law enforcement officer can make a
lawful search for the seizure of evidence when (1)
he is possessed of a valid search warrant authoriz-
ing the search and seizure, or (2) the search is
without a search warrant, but incidental to a law-
ful arrest. A lawful arrest occurs when the arrest
is made either with an arrest warrant or, as more
commonly done, without such a warrant for any
offense against the United States committed in his
presence, or for any felony upon reasonable
grounds to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed or is committing such felony. 7°
In those criminal proceedings where the evidence
is obtained during a search without a warrant, in
order to have the evidence excluded the defendant
is constantly striving to convince the court that
the police officer had no probable cause to make the
arrest. The prosecution is equally trying to show
the existence of probable cause without having to
reveal the name of its secret informants. Here
again, then, is a situation where the informer privi-
lege may come into direct conflict with the de-
fendant's rights.
The case of United States v. Bli/1,71 clearly points
out the conflict in the federal courts and in the
probable cause situations. In Blict, a federal
prohibition agent testified that a "reliable in-
formant" had advised him that the defendant at a
certain time would be making delivery of intoxicat-
ing liquor at a certain designated place on the
evening in question. The agent, without a warrant,
at the designated time and place, stopped and
searched the defendant's car and found it to
contain liquor in violation of the National Prohibi-
tion Act. At the trial the agent refused to disclose
the name of the informer. The court held that
under these circumstances the evidence obtained
could not be considered without the disclosure of
the informant. The informer's identity was
- 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
70 18 U.S.C. §3053 (1952). Many states now provide
that an officer may arrest without a warrant upon a
showing of reasonable or probable cause to believe that
a crime was committed or is presently being committed
in the officer's presence.
7 45 F.2d 627 (D.C. Wyo. 1930).
essential to establish reasonable grounds so that
the court could "determine whether, under all the
circumstances, such information was reliable and
the agent was justified in having such belief."12
It must be noted, however, that the informant's
statement was the only basis upon which the
officer could establish probable cause.
In Scher v. United States,73 federal officers re-
ceived confidential information, which they
thought reliable, that a certain automobile would
be transporting liquor. The officer went to the
specified place and there observed a car being
loaded with heavy packages. Upon a search with-
out warrant, the officers found the car to contain
bootleg liquor. In affirming the conviction after a
trial in which the name of the informant was not
revealed, the Supreme Court distinguished the
Blicz case, holding that the legality of the search
here was based upon what the officers saw and
heard, not the information which caused the
defendant to be observed. It must be emphasized
that the arresting officers were not forced to sus-
tain the validity of their search and seizure solely
upon probable cause resulting from information
which had been furnished them, but could sustain
its validity on what they themselves saw and heard
before the search, seizure and arrest was made.74
An interesting case on this point is Segurola v.
United States.7 5 In Segurola, the officer testified
72 Id. at 629. An interesting problem would have been
posed if the officer in Blich was sued civilly. Since a
search is illegal unless based upon probable cause, and
probable cause could not be established without reveal-
ing the identity of the informer, the Government would
have been torn between the policy of protecting its
agent from civil liability and preserving the secrecy of
its informers.
73 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
74 Reasonable cause may surely be established solely
upon the officer's own investigation after acting upon a
tip from an informer. However, in Sier, the informer
aroused the suspicion of the police officer, and an officer
acting upon suspicion needs far less observation to show
he acted upon probable cause. The officer need only
show for the purpose of satisfying probable cause that
he acted as a reasonable person would under all the
circionstaixes present. Certainly, the loading of heavy
packages, of itself, was not enough to satisfy probable
cause. The legality of the search was in fact based upon
what the officers saw and heard, and the information
which aroused their suspicion. The confidential infor-
mation received in Scher would seem to be vital in the
determination of whether the arrest was legal.
7- 16 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1926), aff'd, 275 U.S. 106(1927). In a vigorous dissent, Judge Bingham held that
once the officer was called and testified to the contents
of the confidential information, the Government waived
its privilege and the defendant became entitled to a full
disclosure, including the name of the informant. "[The
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that he received confidential information that the
defendant would be illegally transporting liquor in
a Buick. When he spotted the Buick, the driver
started to speed and weave and fnally crashed
into a post. The First Circuit court ruled that the
attempt on the part of the defendant to run away
from the officer was sufficient to establish probable
cause and that the informer's name would not have
to be revealed.
76
Wilson v. United States" is one of those rare
cases where an officer was held in contempt for his
refusal to reveal the identity of the person upon
whose information he acted in searching defendant's
premises. In upholding the trial judge's contempt
citation, the Third Circuit held that it was neces-
sary for the trial judge to know whether the
entry was legal or not, since such fact would deter-
mine whether the evidence could be suppressed.
In words reminiscent of those later used by the
Supreme Court, the circuit court held that "if
what is asked is useful evidence to vindicate the
innocence of the accused or lessen the risk of false
testimony or is essential to the proper disposition
of the case, disclosure will be compelled." 78 This
evidence "was essential to the proper disposition of
the case" and therefore the officer should have
disclosed the informant.
In a later Second Circuit case, United States v.
Li Fat Tong,7 the court took a step back in
deciding that the disclosure of an informer's
identity was unnecessary. The defendant was
arrested without a warrant on information supplied
to the arresting agent from another agent, the
latter receiving his information from an unidenti-
fied informer. The court, in a dubious distinction,
indicated that the proof for establishing probable
cause, though based on hearsay, was not from an
"informer," since it was filtered through another
agent. The court's further theory in upholding the
lower court was "that a government official can-
not be compelled to disclose the identity of an
government could not require the officer to disclose so
much of the matter as was helpful to it, and then shut
the door as to any further inquiry by the defendant
relating to the communication." 16 F.2d at 566.
The Supreme Court never reached the disclosure
problem, disposing of the case upon the failure of the
defendant to make a pre-trial motion to exclude the
evidence. The Court held that it was too late to try to
exclude the evidence on trial.76 Cf. United States v. Keown, 19 F.Supp. 639 (W.D.
Ky. 1937), where under similar facts the court held
disclosure necessary.
7 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932).78 Id. at 392.
79 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1945).
informer unless it appears upon the trial that the
disclosure of the informer's name is necessary or
desirable to show the prisoner's innocence." 0 The
decision indicated that the defendant was ob-
viously guilty since he was carrying narcotics
when arrested, and therefore the names of the
secret informers would not prove the defendant's
innocence.
In United States v. Nichols,8' the defendant pro-
tested against the admission of statements by an
informer to establish probable cause without at the
same time disclosing the informer's name. The
district court, taking its lead from the Li Fat Tong
case, overruled the objection, holding that "the
defendant did not allege that it was his belief that
the officer was testifying falsely as to having
received the information, or that a disclosure of the
informer's identity was essential to his defense on
the merits of the case, as necessary or desirable to
show his innocence of the charge against him."82
The Supreme Court in Roviaro, although not
dealing with a probable cause issue, indicated that
under certain circumstances disclosure of the
informer in this area is required. "Where the dis-
closure of an informer's identity, or the contents of
his communication, is relevant and helpful to the
defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair
determination of a cause, the privilege must give
way. " The Court, in dicta, commented:
Most of the federal cases involving this
limitation on the scope of the informer's
privilege have arisen where the legality of
search without a warrant is in issue and
the communications of an informer are claimed
to establish probable cause. In these cases the
Government has been required to disclose the
identity of the informant unless there was
sufficient evidence apart from his confidential
communication.8Y
After Roviaro, most of the federal circuits
80 Id. at 652. (Emphasis added.) Contrast this with
the statement of another Second Circuit opinion. "It is
true that, when they act upon information, it is proper
to compel them to disclose its source-subject to some
limitations-since otherwise there is no way to test
whether they have had 'reasonable cause' for the ar-
rest." United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105, 107 (2d
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 727 (1945).
1178 F.Supp. 483 (W.D. Ark. 1948), aft'd, 176 F.2d
431 (8th Cir. 1949).
Id. at 487.
81353 U.S. at 60. (Emphasis added.) For this prop-
osition the Court cites Scher and Wilson (discussed
above, supra notes 73, 77), both probable cause cases.84Id. at 61.
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applied this dictum,81 holding it to be reversible
error if the name of the alleged informant, upon
whose tip probable cause for the defendant's
arrest was based, was not divulged.8' The decisions
began to center upon whether there was enough
evidence, independent of the informer's tip, to
constitute probable cause.
However, there still is limited authority for the
principle enunciated in Li Fat Tong, that only
upon the trial of the merits of the case if it appears
necessary to show the prisoner's innocence, will
disclosure be compelled.8 7 The decisions following
this principle apply the participant informer type
reasoning of Roviaro to cases involving only a
question of probable cause. Typical of this type of
decision, is Pegram v. United States,88 where the
Sixth Circuit upheld the trial court's refusal (on
the motion to suppress hearing) to reveal the name
of the informer (on the issue of probable cause for
the arrest) since there was no showing that the
informer was in any way connected with the
commission of the offense.
There has also evolved another theory adhered
to by some courts in the probable cause area under
which nondisclosure of the informant is sought to
be justified. In 1959, the Supreme Court held in
Draper v. United States,"' that where an informant
had been reliable in the past, and the information
supplied to the officer is to a great extent corrobo-
rated prior to the defendant's arrest, there is
probable cause for the arrest of the defendant,
despite the fact that the officer's observations,
independent of the information supplied by the
informer, would not constitute probable cause.
The facts in Draper were that a named informer,
85 United States v. Elgisser, 334 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964); United States
v. Robinson, 325 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1963); Costello v.
United States, 298 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 930 (1964); Cochran v. United States, 291 F.2d
633 (8th Cir. 1961). See Marderosian v. United States,
337 F.2d 759 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 971(1965), where probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant was based upon a reliable informant and the
independent observations of the police officer (affiant).
86 United States v. Robinson, supra note 85; Costello
v. United States, supra note 85; Cochran v. United
States, supra note 85. See also United States v. Goss,
237 F.Supp. 26 (S.D. N.Y. 1965).
87 Pegram v. United States, 267 F.2d 781 (6th Cir.
1959). See Jones v. United States, 326 F.2d 124 (9th
Cir. 1963); United States v. Whiting, 311 F.2d 191 (4th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935 (1963); Bruner v.
United States, 293 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 947 (1961).
88 267 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1959).
m 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
who had given accurate tips in the past, told the
police that the defendant would be arriving in
Denver by train from Chicago, wearing certain
clothing, and carrying narcotics. The Supreme
Court held that when the narcotics agents saw the
defendant alight in Denver from an incoming
Chicago train, attired as the informer had pre-
dicted, they had probable cause without more to
arrest the defendant for concealing and trans-
porting narcotics. (It must, be remembered
however, that in Draper, the informer's identity
was disclosed at the hearing on the motion to sup-
press.) "o Combining Scher and Draper, some federal
courts have held that where a reliable informant
supplies the information, which is to some extent
corroborated by the officer's observations prior to
the arrest, disclosure is not required.9 The empha-
sis is placed not upon the independent observa-
tions of the officers, but upon the past reliability
of the informant as bearing upon the issue of
probable cause. However, there is authority for the
proposition that where the reliability of the inform-
ant is essential to establish probable cause, the
Government must name the informant or suffer
suppression of the evidence.'2
The Rugendorf situation is unique in that the
defense sought the identity of the informants in
order to establish lack of probable cause upon
which the search warrant had been issued. A
deficiency in probable cause to issue the search
warrant would have caused the suppression of the
evidence obtained during the search. The Supreme
Court held there was substantial basis for the
Commissioner issuing the search warrant to con-
clude that stolen furs were probably in the de-
fendant's basement. The Court also reaffirmed its
decision in Jones v. United States,'4 that "hearsay
alone does not render an affidavit insufficient, the
Commissioner need not have required the in-
90 Id. at 309.
"1 United States ex. rel. Coffey v. Fay, 344 F.2d 625
(2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Elgisser, 334 F.2d 103
(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964); Buford
v. United States, 308 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1962). See also
Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 936 (1964); United States v.
Peisner, 198 F.Supp. 67 (D. Md. 1961), rev'd on other
groundls, 311 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962). Cf. Cochran v.
United States, 291 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1961).
Cases cited note 85 supra. See also United States v.
Santiago, 327 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v.
Rosario, 327 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1964); Jones v. United
States, 266 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring opinion).
13 Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
94 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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formants... to be produced... so long as there
was a substantial basis for crediting the hear-
say."95 The Court concluded that the underlying
circumstances leading to the conclusions of the
informants appear to have been adequately dis-
closed in the communications themselves; that the
information was received from three independent
sources, and each communication supported the
other. Consequently, the Court held that there
was substantial basis for crediting the hearsay and
the informer's identities need not be disclosed.
Rugendorf was cited with approval in Aguilar v.
Texas,96 a state prosecution for illegal possession of
heroin. The Supreme Court, in striking down a
state search warrant, held, as follows:
[A]lthough an affidavit may be based on
hearsay information and need not reflect the
direct personal observations of the affiant,
[citing Jones v. United States] the magistrate
must be informed of some of the underlying
circumstances from which the informant
concluded that the narcotics were where he
claimed they were, and some of the underly-
ing circumstances from which the officer con-
cluded that the informant, whose identity need
not be disclosed, [citing Rugendorf v. United
States] was credible or that his information
was reliable.97
It would appear, therefore, that the Supreme
Court's preference for search warrants in the
search and seizure area was now carried over to
the informer privilege in the probable cause
sphere. This preference is clearly noted in Aguilar,
where the Supreme Court stated:
[W]hen a search is based upon a magistrate's,
rather than a police officer's, determination
of probable cause, the reviewing courts will
accept evidence of a less "judicially competent
or persuasive character than would have justi-
fied an officer acting on his own without a
warrant," and will sustain the judicial deter-
mination so long as "there was substantial
basis for [the magistrate] to conclude that
narcotics were probably present." 99
The reliance by the Supreme Court in both
'5 376 U.S. at 533.96 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
17 Id. at 114 (Emphasis added).
98 Id. at 111. See also People v. Keener, 55 Cal 2d 714,
361 P.2d 587 (1961). Cf. People v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377,
201 A.2d 39 (1964).
Rugendorf and Aguilar, on Jones, compels a care-
ful consideration of the defense attack on the
search warrant in Jones. In Jones, the petitioner
argued that the search warrant was defective be-
cause of the affiant officer's informants were not
produced; that his affidavit did not even state
their names; and that affiant did not undertake
and swear to the results of his own independent
investigation of the claims made by his informants.
The Court was required to decide whether the
Commissioner acted properly in signing the war-
rant, conceding the truth of the statements
alleged in the affidavit. The defense did not attack
the police officer by contending that he had mis-
represented the facts to the Commissioner, or that
the information given to the police officer was not
that related in the affidavit, or that there was, in
fact, no informant. The Court stated that had
objections been raised that the police officer mis-
represented his basis for seeking a warrant, full
disclosure may have been required. Thus the Court
left open the possibility that a defendant might,
in the proper case, directly attack an alleged
perjurious affidavit where an alleged informer is
used to establish probable cause for its issuance. 99
TESTING RELIABILITY
Many recent decisions have stressed the reli-
ability of the informant as a factor in upholding
the informer privilege. These decisions contend
that probable cause for an arrest may be based, in
part, upon information from a reliable informant,
whose identity need not be disclosed.'
19 The Court commented as follows:
If the objections raised were that Didone [the
affiant] had misrepresented to the Commissioner
his basis for seeking a warrant, these matters might
be relevant. Such a charge is not made. All we are
here asked to decide is whether the Commissioner
acted properly, not whether Didone did. 362 U.S.
at 271.
What result would the Supreme Court in Rugendorf
have reached if the petitioner had attacked the affiant
charging his bad faith in securing the warrant? For
example, suppose the petitioner had attacked the affi-
ant, claiming there was, in actuality, no informer; or
that the information given to the police officer was
materially different than that sworn to by the police
officer in his affidavit. See United States v. Pearce, 275
F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1960), where the court went behind
the affidavit to test the affiant's good faith in securing
the search warrant.
109 Federal cases: Cases cited note 91 supra. State
cases: People v. McCray, 33 Ill. 2d 66, 210 N.E. 2d 161(1965), cert. granted, 384 U.S. 949 (1966); People v. Durr,
28 Ill. 2d 308, 192 N.E. 2d 379 (1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 973 (1964); Drouin v. State, 222 Md. 271, 160 A.2d
85 (1960); State v. Edwards, 317 S.W. 2d 441 (Mo.
[Vol. 58
THE INFORB/ER PRIVILEGE
This contention presents an interesting problem
concerning the permissible area of defense inquiry
into reliability. If the suggested approach is that,
under certain circumstances, the reliability of the
informer is an effective substitute for disclosure,
then a fair hearing necessitates that the defense be
permitted to effectively test reliability. This,
however, presents an apparent dilemma when it is
recognized that questions which are vital in
establishing the informer's reliability may also
tend to disclose his identity.
Those courts that have held that an officer's
past experience with an informant may establish
his reliability, have failed to set any guidelines for
proper defense examination to test those ex-
periences. Some courts have permitted the de-
fendant to inquire about such facts as the length
of time the officer has known the informant, the
number of tips the officer has received from him,
and the number of arrests and convictions secured
on the basis of these tips.10I The state prosecutor,
in a recent Illinois opinion, argued against dis-
closure, contending that the defendant might have
tested the informant's reliability by inquiries such
as when and how often information was secured
from the informer, and who had been arrested as a
result of this information.1n
However, if the Illinois prosecutor's suggestion
is followed, there is a great danger that the in-
formant will be disclosed. Any detailed examina-
tion into the names of those persons arrested as a
result of information supplied by an informant,
may indicate to the defendant the informer's
identity. This danger is readily apparent in the
area of vice crimes (prostitution, gambling and
narcotics) where a defendant, with even limited
connections to vice activities, may be able to
extricate the informant's identity after learning
that he has provided information leading to the
arrest of certain known persons. In fact, the more
reliable the informant, the more information he
has probably given, and the more arrests and
convictions probably secured on the basis of these
tips, and paradoxically, the greater the likelihood
1958); State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 201 A.2d 39 (1964;)
People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y. 2d 86, 204 N.E. 2d 188(1965); People v. Coffey, 12 N.Y. 2d 443, 191 N.E. 2d
263 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 916 (1964); Simmons
v. State, 198 Tenn. 587, 281 S.W. 2d 487 (1955).
101 See People v. McCray, 33 Ill. 2d 66, 210 N.E. 2d
161 (1965), cert. granted, 384 U.S. 949 (1966); People v.
Moore, 154 Cal.App 2d 43, 315 P.2d 357 (1957).
12 People v. Durr, 28 IUI. 2d 308, 192 N.E. 2d 379
(1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964).
that by naming those persons arrested, his identity
will be revealed.
Moreover, if it is proper to argue that the names
of those persons previously arrested on the basis of
the informant's tip are to be revealed in order to
establish his reliability, (and this will undoubtedly
include those persons arrested either with or with-
out an arrest warrant), then by logical extension,
when the informer's information has been used as
the basis for previous searches, either with or with-
out a search warrant, this information, including
the location of the premises searched, should like-
wise be disclosed. Once all this information is
known, the likelihood that the informant can be
identified is greatly increased.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the
mere conwlusion, in an affidavit, that information
received was reliable and from a credible person is
insufficient to sustain a search warrant. In Aguilar
v. Texas,1 3 the Court held that as part of the
evidence constituting probable cause, an affidavit
for a search warrant must disclose some of the
underlying circumstances which reveal the source
of the informant's knowledge and some of the
underlying circumstances from which the officer
concluded that the informant, who need not be dis-
closed, was credible or his information reliable. Al-
though Aguilar deals with a state search warrant,
and as the Court indicates, a search warrant may
be issued on less persuasive or competent evidence
than that required to give probable cause for an
officer to act without a warrant,'°4 the holding
enunciated provides, at the minimum, applicable
standards for an officer also acting without benefit
of a warrant.
Significantly, the Court speaks in the conjunc-
tive, requiring a recital of some of the circum-
stances underlying (1) the source of the informant's
knowledge and (2) the reason the officer concluded
the informant was credible or his information
reliable. It is highly doubtful that the Court will
condition probable cause upon a recital of such
facts and then foreclose the defendant from
inquiring into the truth or falsity of such evidence.
Any defense inquiry into the underlying facts
concerning the source of the informant's knowledge
must invariably consider the how, when and where
questions. "How" encompasses the mode and
method the informant used to obtain his informa-
tion. This may be by direct observation, from the
M 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
104 Id. at 111.
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accused, through a third party, or by recording,
wiretap or other means. "When" and "where"
will involve an examination into the date, place
and time the informant received his information.
105
Unquestionably, the more detailed the questioning,
the greater the likelihood that the informant's
identity will be revealed by the answers.
The second requirement under Aguilar necessi-
tates a showing of some of the underlying circum-
stances from which the officer concluded that the
informer was credible or his information reliable.
The credibility of the informant and the reli-
ability of his information may encompass substan-
tially the same standards. The officer's past
experience with the informant may satisfy this
requirement, but there is a danger, as indicated,
that by disclosing these experiences the identity of
the informant may be revealed. It would appear,
however, that the officer may, by independently
corroborating a substantial part of the information
received prior to an arrest, or if a warrant is
involved, by reciting these corroborating ob-
servations therein, satisfy this requirement.108
The traditional means of establishing or testing
credibility presents an equally formidable problem.
Certainly the reputation of an informant for
truthfulness and veracity are relevant,107 but there
are presently no methods for testing the reputation
of an undisclosed person. Perhaps an examination
into the informant's criminal record, his addiction
to narcotics, if any, or his motive for informing,
would suffice.' 08 As a credibility factor, these
questions are relevant, although subject to diverse
interpretation, since it may be expected that an
informant has involvement with criminal activities.
In fact, the more involved the informant is with
criminal activities, the more acurate his informa-
tion is likely to be. Thus, an informant cooperat-
ing with a narcotics unit has probably had exten-
sive dealings with narcotics, and the fact that he
has narcotics convictions, or is presently addicted
to narcotics, may tend to enhance, rather than
detract from, his reliability.
IBEPACT OF FEDERAL INFORMER PRIVILEGE ON
STATE LAW
The impact of the informer privilege and its dis-
closure aspects on state law is not clear. The
105 See State v. Edwards, 317 S.W. 2d 441 (Mo. 1958).
106 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958);
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
107 See Hill v. State, 151 Miss. 518, 118 So. 539 (1928).
108 See McCoy v. State, 216 Md. 332, 140 A.2d 689
(1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 853 (1958).
Supreme Court's decisions most often appear to
rest upon evidentiary grounds and its supervisory
power over the federal courts.109 Perhaps the
reason why this has been so is because the leading
case, Roviaro, was decided before the celebrated
Mapp case, which held the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule applicable to the states via the
"due process" clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment."0
In an attack on a state conviction, following a
trial in which disclosure was denied, the Supreme
Court might well apply its own concepts through
the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Since the fourteenth amendment guarantees
to an individual a "fair trial" in state prosecu-
tions, a denial by the state court of the informer's
identity, in participant informer cases anyway,
may be considered so unfair as to violate this
fundamental right.Iu
In Drew v. Myers,"' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit had to decide
whether federal constitutional safeguards had
been violated in a state narcotics prosecution.
Prior to trial, the defense counsel requested the
identity of an eye witnesses to the alleged crime
not endorsed on the indictment; the prosecution
responded by denying that there were any other
witnesses except those listed. However, at the
trial, the state's witness, an undercover police
officer, testified that an identified informant made
the initial contact with the accused immediately
prior to the alleged illegal sale of narcotics to him.
The officer further testified that the alleged in-
formant was only about ten feet away when the
illegal transaction occurred.
After conviction in the Pennsylvania state court,
the defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus in the
federal court claiming a deprivation of due process
fourteenth amendment guarantees. The Court of
Appeals affirmed denial of the writ because the
defendant had failed to exhaust his state remedies
prior to initiating the federal suit, but, the court
stated in dictum that the informant was an essen-
109 It appears that the state courts view the federal
standards as constitutional requirements. The states
have been applying the Roviaro "balancing test" in
reviewing their decisions in the informer area. For a
collection of state informer privilege cases, see 76 A.L.R.
2d 262 (1961). See United States ex. rd. Coffey v. Fay,
344 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1965); Cf. State v. Burnett, 42
N.J. 377, 201 A.2d 39 (1964).
110 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"I See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). The
Court will hear, in the 1966 term, a case in which the
issue of informant disclosure in state prosecutions may
be resolved. See McCray v. Illinois, 384 U.S. 949 (1966).1- 327 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1964).
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tial witness as to the identity of the individual
allegedly conducting the illegal transaction, and
was the only person, other than the police officer,
who could have identified the accused as being at
the scene of the alleged sale. In so stating, the
court further held that the cumulative effect of
(a) the Commonwealth's nondisciosure of the in-
former's presence at the scene, (b) denial of
continuance to allow the defense time in which to
locate and produce the informer, and (c) denial of
continuance to secure the testimony of an alleged
alibi witness, raised a reasonable doubt as to
whether constitutional safeguards of fundamental
justice had been violated by the State in its
prosecution of this defendant.
A future defendant in a state "probable cause"
case may challenge his conviction in the Supreme
Court, arguing that the Court must apply federal
constitutional standards to the states in order to
give full impact to the exclusionary rule enunciated
in Mapp. In Priestly v. Superior Court,113 Califor-
nia recognized dearly the ultimate effect of deny-
ing disclosure:
If an officer were allowed to establish unim-
peachably the lawfulness of a search merely
by testifying that he received justifying
information from a reliable person whose
identity cannot be revealed, he would be-
come the sole judge of what is probable cause
to make the search. Such a holding would
destroy the exclusionary rule."4
In Ker v. California,"5 the Supreme Court held
that the fourth amendment's proscriptions are en-
forced against the states through the fourteenth
amendment and that "the standard of reasonable-
ness is the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.. ."" In applying that "standard of
reasonableness," consistent with federal constitu-
tional guarantees, the informer privilege should
give way to test "probable cause" in state prosecu-
tions where federal standards would require it.
In United States ex.rel. Coffey v. Fay,"7 the
defendant was convicted of burglary in a New
York state court. The principal items of evidence
against him at the trial were diamonds from the
burglarized establishment. The trial took place
prior to Mapp, but because defense counsel had
W 50 Cal 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958). For a full dis-
cussion of the facts and holding in Priestly see infra
notes 137 through 143 and accompanying test.
M Id. at 818, 330 P.2d at 43.
1 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
1 Id. at 33.
117 344 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1965).
preserved the search and seizure issue by proper
objection, the New York Court of Appeals directed
a hearing on the admissibility of the jewels in
accordance with Mapp criteria. At the hearing, the
trial judge ruled that the evidence was admissible
since it had been seized in the course of a search
incident to a lawful arrest upon probable cause.
The Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling, and
certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court. n8
Having exhausted all available state remedies,
Coffey petitioned the federal district court for a
writ of habeas corpus, seeking his release from the
state prison. The district court ruled that, on the
state record, because probable cause to arrest
petitioner was based in part upon the tips from
an informer whose name the state refused to
divulge, the petitioner had been deprived of his
fourteenth amendment right to a fair hearing on
the issue of probable cause and granted the writ."9
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, the district court's decision
was reversed and the writ denied.
In denying the writ, the appellate court looked
to the facts of the case and the possible significance
of the informer's testimony. The court held that
under the particular circumstances of the case, the
"petitioner's prospects of demonstrating, with the
help of the informer, that he was arrested without
probable cause, are overbalanced by the State's
dual interest in encouraging the free flow of con-
fidential information and in using probative
demonstrative evidence at the trial of a suspected
criminal."" 0
The court reached this decision on the basis that
federal informer standards, namely Roviaro, are
relevant to state prosecutions. "Petitioner, the
State, and all the courts that have passed on the
case, have treated the leading decision on the
informer's privilege in federal prosecution, Roviaro
v. United States, as if it were fully applicable to
state prosecutions as well."'m Even though it
applied federal standards, in reaching its decision,
however, the Coffey court questioned whether
Roviaro was fully applicable to state prosecutions:
We would suppose that Roviaro would not be
wholly applicable to state prosecutions unless
it expressed a constitutional mandate; if it
U8 12 N.Y. 2d 443, 191 N.E. 2d 263 (1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 916 (1964). For a discussion of Coffey at
the state level, see infra notes 206 through 209 and
accompanying text.
11 234 F.Supp. 543 (S.D. N.Y. 1964).
12 344 F.2d at 634.I Id. at 631.
MELVIN GUTTERMAN
merely laid down a rule of evidence, the
decisions would be fully pertinent to federal
prosecutions alone. Furthermore, this dis-
tinction would apparently be operative even
though the issues being tried in the state
prosecutions were federal issues such as the
legality of a search under the Fourteenth
Amendment. These are the lessons we gather
from Mapp v. Ohio, which also concerned
illegally seized evidence. There the Supreme
Court expressly justified its extension of
the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions on
the ground that the rule was of constitutional
origin rather than merely part of the federal
law of evidence.
Moreover, it seems to us that Roviaro may
have laid down a rule of evidence rather than a
constitutional mandate. The doctrines it
enunciates are derived directly from the
common law.... The opinion never expressely
cites the Fifth Amendment, although its
mention of "fundamental requirements of
fairness" may indicate that in reaching the
Roviaro result, constitutional considerations
were involved to some extent 2 .
THE STATES AND THE INFORS ER PRIVILEGE
Many of the states have encountered the same
problems as the federal courts in trying to balance
the government's desire to protect its source of
information from informants against the funda-
mental rights of a defendant to a full and fair
trial.
Alabama
In Parson v. State,129 the Alabama Supreme
Court in dicta commented, "that a government
official cannot be compelled to disclose the name
of an informer. But there is an exception recog-
nized by the cases based on constitutional grounds
which is that if it appears that the informer's name
is necessary or desirable to show the prisoner's
innocence, the official can be required by the court
to make disclosure."124 And, in Dixon v. State,15 a
prosecution for transporting prohibited liquor, the
Court of Appeals pointed out that "the disclosure
of the identity of an informer [as distinguished
from a participating decoy] is not ordinarily in the
2 Id. at 631 n. 4.
13251 Ala. 467, 38 So. 2d 209 (1948).
14 Id. at 473, 38 So. 2d at 213.
125 39 Ala. App. 575, 105 So. 2d 354 (1958).
public interest save where needful to show the
innocence of the accused.' 12 6
Roach v. State, is interesting in that the state's
case for the selling of prohibited liquor was made
out by the testimony of a federal agent. The
Court of Appeals reversed the lower court on
grounds other than the informer privilege, but in
the course of its opinion the court commented as
follows:
We do not believe an employee of the Federal
Government carries about him a mantle such
as the Roman citizenship that shielded the
Apostle Paul from the municipal law. Hence,
we do not conceive that the superintendency
in Rea v. U.S., operates to such an extent as
to make the principle [of requiring the dis-
closure of the name of a participating decoy]
in Roviaro v. U.S., become the law of Ala-
bama when a Federal witness testifies in a
state court regarding a state crime.as
California
The California Supreme Court, in rapid suc-
cession on the same day, decided three cases that
covered many of the current questions dealing with
the necessity of revealing the informer's identity.
In People v. McShann,129 the California Supreme
Court reaffirmed an earlier appellate ruling which
held that an informer who is a participant in the
offense charged must be identified upon demand
at the trial."0 In McShann, the informer allegedly
made several telephone calls to the defendant
arranging for a sale of narcotics. These telephone
calls were recorded by police officials with the
consent of the informer. On one of the occasions,
after a telephone call, the informer allegedly made
a purchase of narcotics, this purchase being the
basis of the sale charge against the defendant.
Several days later, via another recorded telephone
126 105 So. 2d at 357.
12 39 Ala.App. 271, 97 So. 2d 837 (1957).
128 97 So. 2d at 839. Is the court's comment directed
to the fact that when a federal officer testifies in a state
court, regarding a state crime, the state's rules of
evidence apply? Is the Alabama court, in effect, saying
that when a federal officer testifies in an Alabama court,
the Alabama informer privilege applies? Conversely, is
a state officer, testifying in a federal court, concerning
a federal crime, bound by the federal informer privilege?
For a discussion of the applicability of the federal
informer privilege to the states see supra notes 109
through 122, and accompanying text.
12 50 Cal. 2d 802, 330 P.2d 33 (1958).




conversation, the informer arranged for a second
purchase. After this conversation, the officers fol-
lowed the defendant as he left his home and sub-
sequently stopped his car at a traffic light. As the
defendant alighted from his car he allegedly
dropped a tinfoil packet containing heroin. A
subsequent search of the defendant allegedly re-
vealed four other packets of heroin. At the trial,
the recorded conversations between the informer
and the defendant were played to the jury and,
when on cross-examination the defendant sought
the name of the informant, the prosecution's ob-
jection under the informer privilege was sustained.
As to count 1, the alleged sale, the California
Supreme Court held that the ruling of People v.
Lawrence,"' decided at about the same time as
Roviaro,m was controlling, and the prosecution
was held to have lost its right to withhold the
identity of the informer who is a participant in the
crime alleged. The court indicated that in Cali-
fornia the disclosure of a participant informer was
now mandatory.
However, there was a second count charging
McShann with possession of heroin. In dictum,
the court held that disclosure of the informant is
not limited to one who participates in the crime
alleged:
The information elicited from an informer
may be 'relevant and helpful to the defense of
the accused or essential to a fair determination
of a cause' even though the informer was not
a participant....
When it appears from the evidence, how-
ever, that the informer is also a material witness
on the issue of guilt, his identity is relevant
and may be helpful to the defendant. Nondis-
closure would deprive him of a fair trial.13
The court commented that the prosecution
could have relied solely upon the officer's testi-
mony as to the defendant's possession of heroin
and as to his admissions.' However, it chose also
to introduce evidence of the telephone calls to
33Ibid. Lawreiwe was followed by other appellate
courts. See People v. Alvarez, 154 Cal.App. 2d 694, 316
P.2d 1006 (1957); People v. Castiel, 153 Cal.App. 2d
653, 315 P.2d 79 (1957).
'3 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). The
McShann court commented on the strong parallel be-
tween Roviaro and the instant case.
m 50 Cal. 2d at 808, 330 P.2d at 36.
ra4 The police officer's testimony alleged that the
defendant made admissions concerning the possession
of heroin.
substantiate the officer's testimony and discredit
the defendant's. The court said:
The informer's telephone call was persuasive
evidence on possession, for it indicated that
the defendant was en route to make a sale of
heroin when he was arrested and therefore
knowingly had possession at that time. As the
originator of the telephone call the informer
was a material witness on the issue of posses-
sion. The prosecution made him such a witness
by introducing evidence of his telephone call
to make a purchase of heroin and by playing
a recording of the telephone conversation be-
fore the jury.135
The court held the defendant was therefore en-
titled to the name of the informer who made the
call.136
The informer problem in Priestly v. Superior
Court,IE arose at the preliminary hearing, at which
stage the prosecution in California is required to
present sufficient legal evidence to bind the de-
fendant over for trial."' In Priestly, the informers
were neither participants in, nor material wit-
nesses to, the offense of possession of narcotics.
But the arrest and search was made without a
warrant by officers acting solely on the basis of
communications from informers. At the prelimi-
nary hearing, the defendant unsuccessfully sought
the names of the informants; moved to strike the
testimony of the officers relating to the informers;
and objected to the introduction of the evidence,
claiming it was illegally obtained and therefore
inadmissible because the officers had lacked
reasonable cause to make the arrest. The magis-
trate allowed the prosecutor to invoke the privilege
of nondisclosure and ruled that the evidence was
sufficient to hold the defendant for trial.
In granting a writ of prohibition depriving the
trial court of jurisdiction, the California Supreme
Court held that, in such a case, the defendant has
a right to disclosure of the informant's testimony
L5 50 Cal. 2d at 809, 330 P. 2d at 37.
1n See CAL. CODE Civ. Proc. §1881 (4) which provides
as follows: "A public officer cannot be examined as to
communications made to him in official confidence when
the public interest would suffer by disclosure." The
court interpreted the informer privilege in light of this
section and held that it was for the judiciary to deter-
mine when the public interest would suffer by disclosure.
137 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958).
8 In California only legal evidence may be consid-
ered by the magistrate in determining whether to hold
the accused for trial. See Rogers v. Superior Court, 46
Cal. 2d 3, 291 P.2d 929 (1955).
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or to have the court strike the testimony as to the
informer's tip.39 The court reasoned that to adhere
to the informer privilege in this situation would
make the arresting officer the sole judge of the
issue of reasonable cause and would destroy the
exclusionary rule. 40 The court stated:
If testimony of communications from a confi-
dential informer is necessary to establish the
legality of a search, the defendant must be
given a fair opportunity to rebut that testi-
mony. H-Ie must therefore be permitted to as-
certain the identity of the informer, since
legality of the officer's action depends upon
the credibility of the information, not upon
facts that he directly witnessed and upon
which he could be cross-examined. 4
1
Implicit in the Priestly decision is that if the
search and seizure can be justified without reliance
upon the informer there is no need to disclose his
identity.ln The intended effect of the Priestly
holding is to compel independent police investi-
gations before an arrest may be made on the word
of even the most reliable informers.'"
The court commented: "If the prosecution refuses
to disclose the identity of the informer, the court should
not order disclosure, but on proper motion of the
defendant should strike the testimony as to communi-
cations from the informer." 50 Cal.2d at 819, 330 P.2d
at 43. Striking the testimony of the informer's tip
would rule out the only basis for a showing of reasonable
cause for the arrest and search and would eliminate all
evidence on which to hold the defendant. In effect the
court applied the general federal rule when the informer
privilege is inapplicable; i.e. the prosecution must
either reveal the informer's identity or suffer dismissal
of the charge.
140 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
14 50 Cal.2d at 818, 330 P.2d at 43.
' Prior to Priestly, in order to establish the reliability
of the informer, it was accepted California practice to
permit the officer to testify to such facts as the fol-
lowing: The length of time the police knew the informer;
the number of tips received from him; the number of
arrests and convictions secured on the basis of his
communications. See e.g., People v. Moore, 154 Cal.App
2d 43, 315 P.2d 357 (1957).
143 "[A requirement of disclosure] does not unreason-
ably discourage the free flow of information to law
enforcement officers or otherwise impede law enforce-
ment. Actually its effect is to compel independent
investigations to verify information given by an in-
former or to uncover other facts that establish reason-
able cause to make an arrest or search. Such a practice
would ordinarily make it unnecessary to rely on the
communications from the informer to establish reason-
able cause." 50 Cal. 2d at 818, 330 P. 2d at 43.
See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938),
where the United States Supreme Court also encouraged
the police to make their own independent investigations
of informer's tips. In Sch er, the Court held that there
was sufficient evidence to establish probable cause,
The last of the trio of cases, Mitchell v. Superior
Court,144 was a limited holding by the California
Supreme Court requiring disclosure of a partici-
pant informer at the preliminary hearing. The
court in this case did not grant prohibition since
there was some competent evidence to bind the
defendant over for trial, but emphasized that the
informant would have to be disclosed at the trial,
and, if the magistrate had ruled correctly, it would
obviate any unnecessary delay at the trial to
enable the defendant to locate the informer and
prepare Isdfne
Subsequent to these cases, in People v. Keener,'
a bookmaking prosecution, a search was made
pursuant to a search warrant obtained upon an
affidavit of a police officer, which affidavit was
based partly upon information from an undis-
closed reliable informant. The California Supreme
Court, in sustaining the hearing court's refusal to
disclose the informant, explicitly held "that where
a search is made pursuant to a warrant valid on
its face, the prosecution is not required to reveal
the identity of the informer in order to establish
the legality of the search and the admissibility of
the evidence obtained as a result of it.'
'
In distinguishing Priestly, the court stated that
there is "nothing novel in the view that law en-
forcement officials may be in a more favorable
position where a warrant is obtained than where
action is taken without a warrant."' 47 In explain-
ing the distinction in the rationale between a
search with, as compared to a search without, a
warrant, the court said:
If a search is made pursuant to a warrant
valid on its face and the only objection is that
it was based on information given to a police
officer by an unnamed informant, there is sub-
stantial protection against unlawful search
and the necessity of applying the exclusionary
rule in order to remove the incentive to engage
in unlawful searches is not present. The war-
independent of the information supplied by the in-
former, and sustained the government's claim of the
privilege. The Court, however, implied that disclosure
would be required where the issue of probable cause
rests squarely on the informer's credibility, the Priestly
situation. In Roviaro, the Supreme Court, in dicta,
stated the rule thusly: "[Tihe Government has been
required to disclose the identity of the informant unless
there was sufficient evidence apart from his confidential
communication." 353 U.S. at 61.
4 50 Cal. 2d 827, 330 P.2d 48 (1958).
146 55 Cal. 2d 714, 361 P.2d 587 (1961).




rant, of course, is issued by a magistrate, not
by a police officer, and will be issued only
when the magistrate is satisfied by the sup-
porting affidavit that there is probable cause.
He may, if he sees fit, require disclosure of the
identitiy of the informer before issuing the
warrant or require that the informant be
brought to him. The requirement that an affi-
davit be presented to the magistrate and his
control over the issuance of the warrant di-
minish the danger of illegal action, and it does
not appear that there has been frequent abuse
of the search warrant procedure. One of the
purposes of the adoption of the exclusionary
rule was to further the use of warrants, and it
obviously is not desirable to place unnecessary
burdens upon their use. The additional pro-
tection which would result from application
of the Priestly rule in situations such as the
one involved here would not offset the dis-
advantages of excluding probative evidence
of crime and obstructing the flow of informa-
tion to police.14
The situation in California at this time is that a
defendant may now compel disclosure of an in-
former participant at the preliminary examina-
tion,119 hearing or the "voir dire" examination into
the reasonableness of the arrest and search, 53 as
well as the trial itself.' 5' Where the prosecution
relies upon the informer to establish reasonable
cause for the arrest or search without a warrant,
evidence of his information will be stricken out
unless his name is revealed on demand152 And
when there are several counts charged against the
same defendant, some involving an informer who
is a participant, and some not, and evidence as to
the participant informer is given, the informer's
evidence is also material as to those counts with
which he was not directly involved and disclosure
will be required.-5 However, where a search is
made pursuant to a warrant valid on its face the
prosecution is not required to reveal the identity
148 55 Cal. 2d at 722, 361 P. 2d at 591.
'49 Mitchell v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 827, 330
P.2d 48 (1958).
150 Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330
P.2d 39 (1958).
151 People v. McShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802, 330 P.2d 33
(1958); People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal.App. 2d 435, 308
P.2d 821 (1957).
"' Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330
P.2d 39 (1958).
153 People v. McShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802, 330 P.2d 33(1958).
of the informer in order to establish the legality of
the search and seizure. "'
Florida
The three Florida District Courts of Appeal
appear to be in conflict with each other concerning
the informer privilege. The First District in
Harrington v. State,155 a prosecution for conducting
a lottery, held that the affidavit of a sheriff, though
based largely on information received from an un-
identified confidential informer, stated facts suffi-
cient to show probable cause for issuance of a
search warrant to search the taxicab operated by
defendant, and that the state was not required to
identify this informer. The court further stated
that, "what we have said is not to be construed as
indicating that such disclosure is absolutely priv-
ileged. The trial court may compel the disclosure
when necessary to avoid the risk of false testimony
or to secure useful testimony."
The Harringlon rationale was adhered to by the
same district court in State v. Hardy,57 aprosecu-
tion for unlawful possession of moonshine whiskey,
where the defendant filed a motion for a bill of
particulars to furnish the name, address, telephone
number and size and description of an alleged con-
fidential informer, who was alleged to have gone
into her house. She also demanded to be confronted
by the same alleged informer who claimed to have
made a buy of moonshine whiskey. At the trial,
the defendant again requested information con-
cerning the informer, claiming that the search
warrant was predicated upon an affidavit made by
a fictitious person; that in fact no buy was made;
and that she was deprived of her right to be con-
fronted by, and to cross-examine, this fictitious
informant. The court, in upholding the informer
privilege, relied upon its recently decided Harring-
ing opinion. The court also distinguished this case
from Roviaro, by holding that Roviaro was a pros-
ecution for the unlawful sale of contraband, not
unlawful possession, and further, that there was
15 People v. Keener, 55 Cal. 2d 714, 361 P.2d 587
(1961). In a recently enacted Evidence Code, to become
operative January 1, 1967, California decisional law in
the informer privilege area was to a large extent codified.
See CAL. EVIDENCE CODE §§1041, 1042.
115 110 So. 2d 495 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959), appeal
dismissed without opinion, 113 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1959).
256 110 So. 2d at 497. The court further stated: "The
identity of the informant is in no manner material in
determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant who
produced no testimony whatever in rebuttal of the
state's case." Id. at 498.
157 114 So. 2d 344 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
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no showing that the informer was a participant in
the transaction charged or that he would be a
material witness at the trial.158
In Byers v. State,' 1' a prosecution for conducting
a lottery, the Second District Court of Appeals
held that there was no authority requiring the
state to produce the affiant (informer) upon whose
affidavit a search warrant was based, or to con-
tinue the case until such time as the defendant
might be able to locate him. The court further
pointed out that, in fact, far from refusing to dis-
close the informer's identity, the evidence showed
that the state cooperated in the defendant's effort
to ascertain the identity of the affiant (informer)
and freely afforded defense counsel all information
that the state had as to his identity and wherea-
bouts.
A directly opposite ruling was announced by the
Third District Court of Appeals in Baker v. State,' 0
a prosecution for operating a gambling house. In
Baker, the trial court, as in Byers, refused to quash
an affidavit and search warrant, and refused to
force production of the affiant (informer) on motion
of the defense for a bill of particulars. The court
held that the failure of the trial judge to require
the state to disclose information it had relating to
the individual assertedly signing the affidavit upon
which the search warrant was issued vitiated all
evidence obtained thereunder. The court based its
decision on two grounds. First, the court relied
upon the principle that one accused of a crime is
entitled to be confronted by his accusers, citing the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, and second, that "to expand the rule protect-
ting confidential informants to protect one who
actually executes an affidavit ... would do violence
to provisions of the Federal and State Constitu-
tions .... ,,161 But in a subsequent decision, City of
Miami v. Jones,162 the Third District's decision in
Baker was severely limited, the court now holding
that the defendant was not entitled to the name of
150 The court apparently failed to notice that the
defendant in Roviaro was convicted on two counts; sale
of narcotics to the undisclosed informer, and possession
of narcotics. The Government in the Supreme Court did
not defend the first count, which charged a sale. See
supra note 27 and accompanying text.
1 109 So. 2d 382 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959). See Garcia
v. State, 110 So. 2d 709 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959), recog-
nizing that subject to certain limitations, not discussed
but citing Harrington, the identity of an informant who
gives information concerning the commission of a crime
is privileged.160 150 So. 2d 729 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
1 150 So. 2d at 730.
'6' 165 So. 2d 775 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
a confidential informer upon whose information an
identified officer made an affidavit on which a
search warrant was issued. The court distinguished
the Baker case by reasoning that in Baker the in-
formant was the affiant, and it being charged that
a fictitious name had been signed to the affidavit,
there was no one who could be held for perjury;
while in the instant case the affidavit was sworn to
by an identified police officer who was exposed to
punishment for perjury.Y3
It would seem that it is necessary that the issues
must be resolved by the Florida Supreme Court. 
16
Georgia
The Georgia appellate courts have made a sharp
distinction between an informer and a decoy, rec-
ognizing that in cases of decoys, the defendant has
a right to be informed of the decoy's identity,
while the rule is otherwise in the case of in-
formers.0 5 It is apparent, however, that the courts
have only drawn the usual distinction between a
mere tipster (the informer) and a person who
participates in the crime charge (the decoy).
This distinction is clearly shown in Crosby v.
State,0 6 a prosecution for the illegal sale of whiskey.
The Court of Appeals ruled that a person who ac-
companied a revenue agent and aided in the pur-
chase of the whiskey was a decoy rather than an
informer and that the trial court's refusal to re-
quire the prosecution witness to divulge the decoy's
name was an improper abridgement of the defend-
ant's fundamental right of cross-examination. The
court then commented on the distinction between
113 It is most difficult to follow the court's rationale.
If the court conceded that it is permissible to accept an
affidavit based on the unsworn statement to the affiant,
by an undisclosed informant, known only to affiant, who
thus becomes the sole arbiter of the informant's credi-
bility, why should the court attach greater suspicion to
an affiant who comes before the magistrate in person,
discloses his identity, is sworn, and is available to
thorough cross-examination by the magistrate?
'1 See Ferrera v. State, 101 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1958),
where the Florida Supreme Court refused to reverse a
defendant's conviction for participating in a lottery
because "lurking in the background was some informer
who the appellant should have been permitted to ex-
amine." Id. at 799. It appears that the court was
discussing the informer privilege only in relation to the
possible prejudice to the jury by the police officer's
testimony that he had reason to believe that the defend-
ant was participating in a lottery. See also Chacon v.
State, 102 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1958).
165 Hodges v. State, 98 Ga.App. 97, 104 S.E. 2d 704
(1958), reersed on other grounds, 214 Ga. 614, 106 S.E.
2d 795 (1959); Crosby v. State, 90 Ga.App. 63, 82 S.E.
2d 38 (1954); Anderson v. State, 72 Ga.App. 487, 34
S.E. 2d 110 (1945).
"090 Ga.App. 63, 82 S.E. 2d 38 (1954).
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an informer and a decoy. "There is, however, a
vast difference between an informer (usually a
citizen who communicates to public authorities
suspected infractions of penal laws) and a decoy
(usually a person employed by law-enforcement
agencies to obtain evidence upon which prosecu-
tions are based).'u67
The Court of Appeals in Greeson v. State,1' a
prosecution for the possession and sale of illegal
whiskey, ruled that the prosecution's refusal to
summon as a witness or produce in court the in-
former or decoy upon whom the state did not rely
upon to make out its case before the jury did not
deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to
confrontation and cross-examination. It would also
appear, from Staggers v. State,'69 that the burden
is upon the defendant to show that the person is a
decoy, rather than an informer, and the prosecu-
tion will not be required to divulge the person's
identity to determine if he was a mere informer or
a decoy.
Illinois
In People v. Mack, 70 a search warrant for the
defendant's apartment was procured on the basis
of an affidavit of an informant who admittedly
used a fictitious name. The affidavit stated that
the informer saw, andhad in fact purchased, narcot-
ics on the premises tc be searched. On the motion
to suppress the evidence the defense requested the
informer's identity. This request was refused and
the motion to suppress was denied. The defendant
then proceeded to trial but made no further request
for the informer's identity.
167 82 S.E. 2d at 39. Accord, Smallwood v. State, 95
Ga.App. 766, 98 S.E. 2d 602 (1957); Roddenberry v.
State, 90 Ga.App. 66, 82 S.E. 2d 40 (1954). See also
Anderson v. State, 72 Ga.App. 487, 34 S.E. 2d 110
(1945), where, in a prosecution for unlawful possession
of illegal whiskey, the Georgia Court of Appeals, relying
upon a Georgia statute that provides that official per-
sons shall not be called upon to disclose State matters
of which the policy of the State requires concealment,
held, that ordinarily one who acts in the capacity of a
peace officer will not be required to disclose the name of
his informant concerning the crime for which the
accused is being held. However, the facts in Anderson
show that the informer merely supplied the police with
information, and did not participate in the investigation
or act as a decoy.
The Georgia Supreme Court, in Morgan v. State, 211
Ga. 172, 84 S.E. 2d 365 (1954), a murder prosecution,
relying upon the same statute, and upon Anderson,
ruled that a police officer was not required to disclose
the names of persons who had given the officer informa-
tion leading to the defendant's arrest.
16s 97 Ga.App. 245, 102 S.E. 2d 503 (1958).
10 101 Ga.App. 463, 114 So. 2d 142 (1960).
170 12 ill. 2d 151, 145 N.E. 2d 609 (1957).
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois from
a conviction for unlawful possession of heroin, the
defense asserted that the prosecution's refusal to
disclose the identity of the informant denied the
defendant due process of law and also denied him
the right under the state constitution to meet the
witnesses against him face to face and to have proc-
ess to compel the attendance of witnesses in his
behalf. The court, in affirming the conviction,
noted that it was only during the hearing on the
motion to quash the search warrant that the de-
fense made any demand for the informer to be
identified, and that the attack on the search war-
rant was not pursued in the appellate court. The
court further held that there was no basis for up-
setting the public purpose upon which the informer
privilege rests where it appears that the informer
took no part in serving the search warrant or in the
defendant's arrest; that he neither participated in
the defendant's crime nor helped set up its com-
mission; and that no part of his communication to
the police or conversations with defendant were
used as evidence in the case.
In People v. Reed,m the trial court restricted the
defendant's cross-examination of the arresting
officer, and of a federal agent, as to the identity
and whereabouts of an informer who introduced
the federal agent to the defendant. The Illinois
Supreme Court, citing Mack, held that this re-
striction on cross-examination was not improper
since there was no showing that the informer par-
ticipated in the transaction with which defendant
was charged or that his testimony would in any
way be helpful to the defendant.
The leading Illinois informer privilege case is
People v. Durr,72 a probable cause informer de-
cision. In Durr, the arresting officer testified at the
motion to suppress, that a short time prior to the
arrest charged a reliable informer told him that a
man named Ray was peddling narcotics, was
traveling in an old blue car and would be making a
delivery of narcotics at a designated place. The
informer also gave the officer a detailed description
of the man. Acting on this information, the officer
went to the described area and observed a man
fitting the informer's description driving the de-
scribed car into a parking lot. The officer followed
the auto into the lot and as the defendant alighted
from the car he was placed under arrest. A search
17121 Ill. 2d 416, 173 N.E. 2d 422 (1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 990 (1962).
17 28 Ill. 2d 308, 192 N.E. 2d 379 (1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 973 (1964).
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of his person revealed the heroin forming the basis
for the motion to suppress and defendant's sub-
sequent conviction for possession of narcotics.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in sustaining the
trial court's refusal to reveal the identity of the
informer, commented as follows:
In our consideration of this question we have
been unable to perceive any necessity to hold
inherent in the constitutional safeguards pro-
tecting those charged with crime the right to
information completely irrelevant to the ques-
tion of innocence, disclosure of which would
seriously hamper effective law enforce-
ment.... Considering also the deterrent as-
pects of the civil and criminal remedies for
false arrests, it is our opinion that determina-
tion of probable cause by reliance upon the
officer's testimony as the reliability of an
otherwise anonymous informer is likely to
produce evils of far less consequence than
those resulting from depriving the public of an
important source of information necessary to
the suppression of a particularly vicious form
of crime.,
The Durr opinion was recently re-examined in
People v. McCray, 74 where the defense argued that
the policies underlying the Durr decision ought to
be reconsidered and Durr overruled. After discuss-
ing the recent federal informer privilege cases, the
court adhered to its former ruling in Durr stating:
[W]e believe that an accused is afforded con-
stitutional protection against unreasonable
search and seizure if the State is compelled to
support a search incidental to an arrest with-
out a search warrant by credible evidence
showing the basis for reasonable cause by the
arresting officer. We do not believe that it is
necessary to bare the identity of every inform-
ant assisting society in its struggle against the
narcotic traffic in order to preserve the funda-
mental guarantees of the Constitution. Other-
wise the so-called informant's privilege and its
value would disappear.17
Kentucky
In Brewster v. Commonwealth,176 a police officer,
acting upon information furnished to him by an
173 Id. at 314, 192 N.E. 2d at 382.
174 33 Ill. 2d 66, 210 N.E. 2d 161 (1965).
1
7
5 Id. at 73, 210 N.E. 2d at 165, cert. granted, McCray
v. Illinois, 384 U.S. 949 (1966).
176 278 S.W. 2d 63 (Ky. 1955).
informer, arrested an identified individual. This
individual gave the officer further information im-
plicating the defendant in a burglary. The Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals, quoting from a federal
district court's opinion, United States v. Keown,177
that an "officer may use the facts furnished by the
informer as a basis for his own investigation and
discover sufficient facts to search or arrest without
disclosing the source of his information, 178 held
that the officer was not required to divulge the
name of the informer.
Maine
In State v. Fortin,79 a prosecution for maintain-
ing a nuisance, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine, in upholding the trial judge's ruling that
the defendant was not entitled to the names of the
individuals who initiated complaints against him,
stated:
It is a well-settled rule that a defendant upon
the trial of an indictment against him is not
entitled as of right to know who gave the in-
formation or made the complaints which
started the prosecution. Such communica-
tions to officers of the law should ordinarily
be regarded as privileged as to the identity of
the informant or complainant on the ground
of public policy, so that no one from fear of
consequences to him personally shall hesitate
to give information of offenses.'18
Maryland
In two recent cases, the Maryland Court of
Appeals has defined the state's privilege of non-
disclosure in both the probable cause and partici-
pant informer area. In McCoy v. State,18' a prosecu
tion for possession and control of narcotic drugs,
the accused, when questioned by a police lieu-
tenant admitted he knew the informer, who, by
arrangement with the police had bought the drugs
177 19 F.Supp. 639 (W.D. Ky. 1937).
17s 278 S.W. 2d at 61.
179 106 Me. 382, 76 Atl. 896 (1910).
180 Id.at 383, 76 Atl. at 896. In sustaining the privi-
lege of nondisclosure, the court also held that it was im-
material whether reference to the complainant was made
by the prosecution or by the defense.
See also State v. Soper, 16 Me. 293 (1839), where it
was held that the owner of property alleged to have
been stolen is not bound to disclose the names of persons
in his employ who supplied him with information
which induced him to take measures leading to the de-
tection of the accused.




from the defendant. At the trial, one of the police
officers disclosed the name of the informer without
any demand being made. Several other questions
were asked about the informer. Was the informer
a dope addict? Had he ever been arrested? Did the
police officer know where the informer was at this
time? But at no time did the defendant ask for the
identity of the informer, demand that the state
call him as a witness, or request the state to explain
his absence.
The court held that ordinarily the state has a
privilege of nondisclosure, and is not required to
divulge the name of a person who furnished infor-
mation of violations of law to an officer charged
with enforcing that law. An exception to this gen-
eral rule is when the informer is an integral part of
the illegal transaction. This exception does not
apply, however, if the informer was already known
to the accused or if he is not known, the accused
fails to make proper demand at the trial for dis-
closure of the identity of the informer.8 2 Since the
informer was already known to the defendant, and
no demand was made for further identification, the
exception in the instant case did not apply. The
court further stated that the mere fact that the
state failed to call the informer as a witness was
not important.
In the second case, Drouin v. State,ls3 the state,
in order to establish a lawful arrest so that evidence
obtained by police officers would be admissible
against the accused with respect to the misde-
meanor count of statutory theft, attempted to
show that the officers had reasonable grounds to
suspect that a felony had been committed and that
the accused was the guilty party. To this effect the
state offered proof that the officers knew that a
home had been burglarized and certain property
stolen therefrom. Further testimony by the officers
tended to show that on the evening of the crime
they had been informed by certain neighbors that
the accused had been seen in the rear of the bur-
glarized home shortly after its occupants had left,
acting in a suspicious manner.
The court found that the trial court did not pur-
port to decide whether the names of the informers
18n For this proposition the court cites Sorrentino v.
United States, 163 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947) (informer
disclosed by record); United States v. Conforti, 200
F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925
(1952) (no demand); and United States v. Colletti, 245
F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 874 (1957)
(no demand). For a discussion of other cases involving
this problem, see supra notes 42 through 48 and accom-
panying text.
183 222 Md. 271, 160 A.2d 85 (1960).
were material to the defendant's defense or to the
determination of the issue of probable cause, and
that the accused was entitled to this proper exer-
cise of the trial court's discretion as to the necessity
of disclosure. In so holding, the court commented
as follows:
We think the reasonable and proper rule after
careful consideration of all of the authorities,
to be that in criminal cases where the prob-
able cause for the defendant's arrest depends
wholly, or in part, on information received
from a nonparticipating informer, if the name
of the informer is useful evidence to vindicate
the innocence of the accused, lessen the risk of
false testimony or is essential to a proper dis-
position of the case, disclosure should be com-
pelled, or the evidence obtained by reason of
the arrest and search suppressed. If the ac-
cussed asserts any substantial ground indicat-
ing that the identity of the informer is material
to his defense or the fair determination of the
case on the issue of probable cause the trial
court should require the informant's name to
be given [or the evidence suppressed] so that
the informant may be summoned and interro-
gated if it be necessary to do so in order to
determine whether or not the officer had prob-
able cause to make the arrest."4
Massachusetts
In an action for maliciously and falsely repre-
senting to the Treasury Department of the United
States that the plaintiff was intending to defraud
the revenue, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, in Worthington v. Scribner,185 held
that the defendant cannot be compelled to answer
interrogatories filed by the plaintiff inquiring as to
18 Id. at 286, 160 A.2d at 92. The court further
discussed the California rule enunciated in Priestly v.
Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958),
stating: "While there is much logic and sound reasoning
in the Priestly case. . . we do not deem it necessary nor
desirable to establish such a hard and inflexible rule as
stated in that case. Of course, disclosure may be nece.-
sary in many instances as the only means available to
afford the traverser an opportunity to establish that no
informers did, in fact, exist; or, if they did exist, they
did not transmit the information claimed. On the other
hand, there may be circumstances that call for the trialjudges to exercise their sound discretions as to whether
disclosure should be required." 222 Md. at 285, 160 A.2d
at 92. Cf. State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 201 A.2d 39
(1964), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court com-
mented: "We read Drouin v. State... to eschew an
invariable requirement of disclosure." 42 N.J. at 383,
201 A.2d at 42.185 109 Mass. 487 (1872).
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whether they did not give or cause to be given to
the department information of supposed frauds on
the revenue contemplated by the plaintiffs.
judge Gray, in expressing this rule, stated the
oft quoted reason therefore:
It is the duty of every citizen to communicate
to his government any information which he
has of the commission of an offense against its
laws. To encourage him in performing this
duty without fear of consequences, the law
holds such information to be among the secrets
of state, and leaves the question how far and
under what circumstances the name of the in-
formers and the channel of communication
shall be suffered to be known, to the absolute
discretion of the government, to be exercised
according to its views of what the interests of
the public require. Courts of justice therefore
will not compel or allow the discovery of such
information, either by the subordinate officer
to whom it is given, by the informer himself,
or by any other person, without the permission
of the government. The evidence is excluded,
not for the protection of the witness or of the
party in the particular case, but upon general
grounds of public policy, because of the confi-
dential nature of such communications. 186
Michigan
People v. Laird187 was a prosecution for burglary
in which the police officers, in explaining their
presence in the place of the burglary, testified that
they received information that the place would be
burglarized. On cross-examination each officer was
asked a number of questions relating to the source
from which they derived their information that a
burglary was planned, but the questions were dis-
allowed. In sustaining the trial court, the Michigan
Supreme Court stated the general rule that persons
16 Id. at 488. In Pihl v. Morris, 319 Mass. 577, 66
N.E. 2d 804 (1946), the Massachusetts' Supreme Judi-
cial Court, in a trial for slander and malicious prosecu-
tion, held, that evidence of statements made by the
defendant to a police officer was not excludable on the
grounds that the statements were privileged communi-
cations. The court reasoned that defendant's identity as
the informer against the plaintiff, and the substance of
the accusations, had already become a matter of public
record when the defendant instituted a criminal com-
plaint against the plaintiff. The court further explained
its earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Congdon, 265
Mass. 166, 165 N.E. 467 (1928), as holding that the
privilege announced in Scribner does not apply when the
informer is known or when the communication has
already been divulged.
187 102 Mich. 135, 60 N.W. 457 (1894).
engaged in the detection of crime are not bound to
disclose the source of information which led to the
apprehension of the prisoner. However, the court
remarked that "a case might arise where a person
claiming to have been innocently at the place of
the crime, at the solicitation of a person suspected
of being the informant, would be entitled to in-
quire whether such person was the informant."'8
Apparently the court was referring to the defense
of entrapment and since the defense in hand was
alibi, no such case was presented.
Mississippi
The Mississippi Supreme Court, in the informer
privilege-probable cause area, has apparently
adopted the federal court's Scher rationale, i.e.,
that disclosure will be required unless there is suffi-
cient information, aside from the informer's tip,
to constitute probable cause.
In the early case of Ford v. Jackson,5 9 a police
officer testified that he had been informed by relia-
ble persons that defendant was handling whiskey on
certain streets. Suspecting that the defendant had
intoxicating liquor, the police officer pursued him
for the purpose of arrest and search. In this pur-
suit the defendant threw a pint bottle of whiskey
from his car. After stopping the car and arresting
the defendant, a further search of the car revealed
additional whiskey.
The court ruled that the search began at the
time of pursuit and that no crime was committed
in the officer's presence. The court further held
that the undisclosed informant's information to
the police officer making the search did not consti-
tute probable cause, and that the evidence regard-
ing the names of the persons giving this informa-
tion was improperly excluded. "[Tihe defendant
was entitled to know the source of the officer's in-
formation upon which he acted with a view of
challenging its sufficiency as well as the credibility
of the officer claiming to have the information con-
stituting probable cause."'19
Hill v. State'9' involved a search of an automobile,
without a warrant, for intoxicating liquor. The
court held that the defendant had a right to know
the name of the party who had given the police
188 Id. at 140, 60 N.W. at 457. The general rule
enunciated in Laird was quoted in People v. Asta, 337
Mich. 590, 602, 60 N.W. 2d 472, 479 (1953). Compare
Laird with State v. Boles, infra note 212.
m 153 Miss. 616, 121 So. 278 (1929).
190 Id. at 619, 121 So. at 279.
191 151 Miss. 518, 118 So. 539 (1928).
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officer information which, if believed and acted
upon by the officer, constituted probable cause:
The informant might have been shown to be a
notorious liar in that community, or a person
of unquestionable integrity. These facts the
court must have, in order to determine
whether the officer's belief in the truth of the
statement was warranted, and in order to
allow the defendant an opportunity to show
that the statement upon which the officer
acted was unworthy of belief and no probable
cause existed for such search.192
More recently, in Harris v. State'", a prosecution
for transporting illegal whiskey, the sheriff had been
informed that a load of whiskey would be delivered
that night at a certain place. Acting on this infor-
mation, the sheriff proceeded to a concealed posi-
tion near a public highway, and from this position
he observed the defendant drop and break a jug of
liquor. He testified that he was dose enough to
smell and know that it was whiskey. He thereupon
arrested the defendant. The court, in affirming the
defendant's conviction, held that the sheriff would
not be required to name his informer inasmuch as
the arrest was made on what he learned through
his own knowledge. The court commented that
"this arrest was not made upon information given
the sheriff by his unnamed informant. True he
went to this particular place pursuant to that in-
formation but he made his arrest on what he saw.
... This was a misdemeanor being committed in
his presence."'14
Missouri
State v. Edwards"' involved a prosecution for
unlawful possession of heroin. The defendant com-
plained that the trial court erred in refusing to
require a police officer, at the pre-trial motion to
suppress the evidence, to divulge the name of the
informant whose tip led to the arrest of the defend-
ant and the discovery of narcotics hidden in the
defendant's car. The officer testified that the de-
fendant was a known narcotics addict and that it
had been rumored that he was selling narcotics in
the street. About ten minutes before the defendant
was arrested, the informant, who from past experi-
12 Id. at 520, 118 So. at 539. Accord, Mapp v. State,
148 Miss. 739, 114 So. 825 (1927); Hamilton v. State,
149 Miss. 251, 115 So. 427 (1928).
193 216 Miss. 895, 63 So.2d 396 (1953).
9'Id. at 901, 63 So.2d at 397.
195 317 S.W. 2d 441 (1958).
ence was thought to be reliable, personally told the
officer that the defendant was selling narcotics
from his car; that the defendant would pick up a
customer and take him around the corner to make
the sale; and that he (the informer) had seen the
defendant approach a user. Upon receipt of this
information the officer went in search of the defend-
ant and spotted him as he drove his car with a
known drug addict riding alongside him. The de-
fendant's car was stopped and he was placed under
arrest. A capsule of heroin, the evidence sought by
the defense to be suppressed, was found under the
seat.
The trial judge did not require that the name of
the informer be divulged, although he did permit
full interrogation of the officer as to the age, sex,
and habits of his informant, and the methods,
places, and times of the informant's communica-
tions with the officer. In making this ruling the
trial judge expressly stated that he was following
State v. Bailey,96 which held that a police officer
was not required to divulge the identity of an in-
formant upon whose information he bases his
right to arrest or search.
The Missouri Supreme Court held, however, that
to the extent that the Bailey case held the privilege
unqualified, it was overruled. The court stated:
[lit would simplify matters if the question of
divulgence or non-divulgence of the identity
of any informant could be finally ruled one
way or the other so as to apply to all cases.
...It is dear, however, that if due regard be
given to the demands of justice to the public
on one hand and the constitutional rights of
the defendant on the other, each case miLst
be considered on its merits. * * *
[T]he question of whether the disclosure of the
identity of a non-participating informant is
essential to assure a fair determination of the
issue in any given criminal case is-for the trial
court in the first instanct.19
Consequently, the judgement was reversed, and
the case remanded to the trial court for the exercise
of its discretion, to determine whether the defend-
ant could have a fair trial without requiring disclo-
sure of the informant.'13
196 320 Mo. 271, 8 S.W.2d 57 (1928). Bailey adopted
the unqualified rule that an officer is not required to
reveal the name of the person from whom he receives
information upon which he bases his right to krrest or
search.1"7 317 S.W.2d at 447. ", "




In People v. Doke,'" a prosecution for receiving,
buying and having stolen certificates of ownership
of motor vehicles, the defense sought to obtain, by
demand for particulars, the identity and address
of the informant who introduced the police officer
to him. The prosecution refused to name and lo-
cate the person relying on the common law priv-
ilege reflected in recently enacted laws.2 At trial,
on cross-examination, the defense again sought the
identity of the informant.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that
under the facts of this case the evidence of entrap-
ment was insufficient to require a finding that dis-
closure of the identity and whereabouts of the
police collaborator was essential to a fair deter-
mination of that defense. In so ruling the court
stated:
The legislative policy of New Jersey as de-
clared by [statute] is opposed to such revela-
tion unless the trial judge finds it is essential
to a fair determination of the issue of entrap-
ment. A frivolous demand for the informa-
tion, or one based only on an unsworn asser-
tion that the defendant was seduced into
perpetrating the crime by the creative activity
of police officers need not be recognized. ...
The public interest to be served by preserv-
ing the free flow of information of criminal ac-
tivities, and by employing investigative agents
participant cases? See State v. Redding, 357 S.W. 2d
103 (1962), recognizing the rule that disclosure rests
within the discretion of the trial court, and is not
required where the informer was not a participant. See
also State v. Cookson, 361 S.W. 2d 683 (1962), holding
that the trial court's failure to exercise discretion in
determining whether the defendant could have a fair
trial, without requiring officer to disclose the identity of
an informant on whose information the arrest was made,
constituted reversible error. The trial court evidently
did not know that Bailey was modified, if not overruled,
by Edwards. The Cookson court stated: "Not only did
the court treat the privilege against disclosure as
unqualified, it does not appear whether the informer
was a participant or nonparticipant in the offense." 361
S.W.2d at 684.
1- 41 N.J. 422, 197 A.2d 185 (1964).
200 N.J.S. 2A:84 A-28, N.J.S.A.
"A witness has a privilege to refuse to disclose the
identity of a person who has furnished information
purporting to disclose a violation of a provision of the
laws of this State or of the United States to a repre-
sentative of the State or United States or a govern-
mental division thereof, charged with the duty of
enforcing that provision, and evidence thereof is inad-
missible, unless the judge finds that (a) the identity of
the person furnishing the information has already been
otherwise disclosed or (b) disclosure of his identity is
essential to assure a fair determination of the issues."
who have, or acquire by deception or other-
wise, access to persons engaged in such activ-
ities, should not be thwarted unless a showing
is made that a defense such as entrapment is
presented in good faith, with some reasonable
factual support, and that the informer is a
material witness necessary to the fair deter-
mination of the defense. If the rule were other-
wise, a defendant by the mere naked allega-
tion that he intended to rely on the defense
could force the state to reveal the name and
whereabouts of the informer and, on its refusal
to do so, gain dismissal of the prosecution.20'
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a
well reasoned opinion, State v. Burnett,202 had occa-
sion to deal with the informer privilege in the prob-
able cause area. InBurnett, a prosecution for posses-
sion of lottery slips, the arresting officer was told
by a known confidential informant that in about
10-15 minutes a blue Mercury of a given age, driven
by a colored male, would enter a specified parking
lot and that the driver would leave with lottery
slips on him. The ensuing events squared with the
information given by the informer and as the car
was backed out of the lot the driver and the de-
fendant (a passenger) were arrested.
The court held that the defendant could not
raise the issue as to whether the trial court's re-
fusal to suppress the evidence obtained in a search
without a warrant was in violation of his constitu-
tional right-on the basis that the state did not re-
veal the confidential informant upon inquiring
into probable cause-since there was no demand
for disclosure or demand to strike the testimony on
nondisclosure. Since the state was never given a
choice between disclosure and loss of the officer's
testimony by proper demand, the issue was im-
properly raised. However, the court realized that
the doctrine of the informer privilege was then
provoking so much current litigation that it pro-
ceeded to deal with therightto disclosure when prob-
able cause is an issue.
After discussing the recent federal court opinions
in Roviaro and Rugendorf, the court felt that they
were not bound by the federal constitution in the
informer privilege area. "We are satisfied that
there is no federal expression settling the issue in
constitutional terms. More specifically ... Roviaro
has not been thought to state a view of the Fourth
Amendment binding upon us under Mapp v.
20141 N.J. at 435, 197 A.2d at 192.
20242 N.J. 377, 201 A.2d 39 (1964).
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Ohio.. ."0 The court then stated its views and
future judicial policy in this area. Since this de-
cision is a realistic approach to a most difficult
problem, an extensive quote from Burnett may be
helpful and enlightening:
If a defendant may insist upon disclosure of
the informant in order to test the truth of the
officer's statement that there is an informant
or as to what the informant related or as to
the informant's reliability, we can be sure
that every defendant will demand disclosure.
He has nothing to lose and the prize may be
the suppression of damaging evidence if the
State cannot afford to reveal its source, as is
so often the case. And since there is no way to
test the good faith of a defendant who presses
the demand, we must assume the routine de-
mand would have to be routinely granted. The
result would be that the State could use the
informant's information only as a lead and
could search only if it could gather adequate
evidence of probable cause apart from the
informant'sdata. Perhaps that approach would
sharpen investigatorial techniques, but we
doubt that there would be enough talent and
time to cope with crime upon that basis.
Rather we accept the premise that the in-
former is a vital part of society's defensive
arsenal. The basic rule protecting his identity
rests upon that belief. * * *
The question then is whether in view of all
of these circumstances it is reasonable and
consistent with the purpose and the effective
enforcement of the Fourth Amendment to
deny disclosure of the informer upon a chal-
lenge to the existence of probable cause. We
think the public can be accorded the benefit
of the informer privilege without a significant
dilution of the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment is served if a judi-
cial mind passes upon the existence of probable
cause. Where the issue is submitted upon an
application for a warrant, the magistrate is
trusted to evaluate the credibility of the
affiant in an ex parte proceeding. As we have
said, the magistrate is concerned, not with
whether the informant lied, but with whether
the affiant is trustful in his recitation of what
he was told. If the magistrate doubts the
credibility of the affiant, he may require that
203 Id. at 384, 201 A.2d at 43.
the informant be identified or even produced.
It seems to us that the same approach is
equally sufficient where the search was without
a warrant, that is to say, that is should rest
entirely with the judge who hears the motion
to suppress to decide whether he needs such
disclosure as to the informant in order to de-




Until the celebrated Mapp case, New York had
been functioning under the Defore235 doctrine
which did not require exclusion of illegally ob-
tained evidence. In People v. Coffey,2°' the trial for
burglary took place prior to the Mapp decision,
but because defense counsel had preserved the
search and seizure issue by proper objection, the
New York Court of Appeals returned the case for
a hearing to determine if the evidence admitted at
the trial should have been excluded.
At that hearing, an F.B.I. agent testified that
he had received information from an informant,
whom he had used in the past, that the defendant
and another were burglars of a certain jewelry store,
and that they along with a third person, were
attempting to dispose of the jewels. The agent
further testified that the informant told him he
had seen the jewels in the defendant's possession,
and the description given by the informant tallied
with that of the missing jewels. The agent also
testified that he listened to a telephone conversa-
tion between the informant and the third person
in which the theft was discussed and in which the
third person indicated that all three men would
meet in front of a theater at a specified time to
dispose of the jewels. The agent checked and
learned that all three men had criminal records.
Armed with this information the federal agent
notified New York City detectives, told them what
he had learned, and in conjunction with the detec-
tives an arrest and search took place near the
theater. The search uncovered the stolen jewels-
the evidence admitted at the trial and the subject
of the hearing. The two New York City detectives
that were notified testified to substantially the
same facts. In addition, two New York Assistant
District Attorneys testified that they had met the
2 4 Id. at 385, 388, 201 A.2d at 43, 45.
205 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585
(1926).
206 12 N.Y. 2d 443, 191 N.E. 2d 263 (1963), cerl.
denied, 376 U.S. 916 (1964).
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informer after the search and that the informer
verified the federal agent's story.
Defense counsel, at the hearing, repeatedly re-
quested the informer's identity to check the agent's
testimony, but the People successfully pleaded the
informer privilege, asserting that disclosure might
endanger the informer's life. In sustaining the
ruling by the hearing judge, the New York Court
of Appeals held that there was enough proof which
added up to "probable cause" for the defendant's
arrest, and that the People's refusal to name the
informer was not error. The court stated that
"when as here, the person whose name is held back
is a mere transmitter of information and not in
any sense a competent witness as to the crime it-
self and when there is, as there is here, strong and
dependable proof of the accuracy of his informa-
tion, 'proper balance' makes nondisclosure appro-
priate. [Citing People v. McShann1." 7 The courts
reliance on McShann,2° a California prosecution
involving the informer privilege in the participant
informer area, and the quoted statement, both
reflect the court's failure to draw the necessary
distinctions between the informer privilege when
probable cause is in issue, as distinguished from
the trial on the merits when guilt or innocence is
being determined329
The Coffey decision was later distinguished, in
People v. Malinsky,210 on rather questionable
207 Id. at 453, 191 N.E. 2d at 267.
209 For an analysis of the McSlann decision see supra
notes 129 through 136 and accompanying text.
209 The dissenting judge in Coffey drew the necessary
distinction. He commented as follows: "In the case
before us, a showing of probable cause necessarily
depended in part upon the information furnished by the
unknown informer .... It may well be that the proof
of the defendant's guilt is clear but that does not decide
this appeal, for, as the court emphasized in the Roviaro
case 'fundamental requirements of fairness' are in-
volved." 12 N.Y. 2d at 455, 191 N.E. 2d at 269.
Coffey subsequently proceeded by way of the federaljudicial system, petitioning the federal district court for
a writ of habeas corpus. The district court, in granting
Coffey's petition, agreed with the dissenting judge's
decision that "a showing of probable cause necessarily
depended in part on the information furnished by the
unknown informer." The court stated that "upon all the
circumstances disclosed by this record, the conclusion
is compelled that the privilege exercised by the State in
withholding the identity of the informer deprived tha
petitioner of his constitutional right to a fair hearing on
the issue of probable cause." 234 F.Supp. 543, 552(S.D.N.Y. 1964). On appeal by the State to the Court of
Appeals, the district court's judgment was reversed, and
the writ denied. 344 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1965). For a dis-
cussion of the Court of Appeals opinion, and of the due
process questions posed, see supra notes 117 through 122
and accompany text.
210 15 N.Y. 2d 86, 204 N.E. 2d 188 (1965).
grounds and it would appear that the New York
Court of Appeals has reconsidered the former hold-
ing. The problem in Malinsky arose at the hearing
on a motion to suppress, at which time defense
counsel requested the name of the informant. The
defense claimed that the police had no such in-
formant but had acquired their information by
means of an illegal wire tap. The People asserted
the informer privilege, and they were sustained by
the motion judge. The New York Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded the case for a new hearing
on grounds other than those involved in the in-
former privilege area. In discussing the procedure
to be followed at the new hearing the court stated
that the requirements of fairness necessitated
disclosure unless the People could produce other
evidence at the hearing-apart from the informant's
tale-sufficient to constitute probable cause. The
court further stated, in language that seems to re-
flect second thoughts on its earlier Coffey opinion,
the following:
[D]isclosure of the informer's identity is re-
quired only in those cases, and they are rela-
tively rare, where there is insufficient evidence,
apart from the arresting officer's testimony as
to the informer's communications, to establish
probable cause. Where such separate evidence
exists, the arrest and consequent search will be
upheld without requiring disclosure of the in-
former. But where disclosure is demanded by
the requirements of a fair trial-where, in
other words, to refuse disclosure would com-
pletely deprive the defense of the opportunity
of showing that there was in truth no reliable
informer or, if there was, that his communica-
tion to the police was different from that testi-
fied to and that, for either of these reasons,
the police did not have probable cause to make
the arrest-the prosecution must either dis-





In State v. Boles,22 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that the refusal of the trial court to
compel a state's witness to disclose the name of a
confidential informer who accompained him in
purchasing intoxicating liquor from the defendant
was not error, when at the time the witnesses'
testimony was uncontradicted and nothing ap-
21 Id. at 93, 204 N.E. 2d at 194.
22 246 N.C. 83, 97 S.E. 2d 476 (1957).
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peared in evidence concerning the informer except
the fact that he was present when the witness made
the purchase. After the prosecution rested, the
defendant took the stand and denied the sale,
claiming he was not even home at the time of the
alleged sale. He did not renew his request for the
informer's identity. The court stated that "had
the defendant, in light of this conflict, requested
the name of the confidential informer as a possible
defense witness, a more serious question would
have been presented .... The propriety of disclosing
the identity of an informer must depend on the
circumstances of the case and at what stage of the
proceedings the request is made." 2' The court
held that at the stage of the trial when disclosure
was requested the defendant had not made a suffi-
cient showing to require disclosuren
4
Ohio
In State v. Beck,2 5 on information given to the
police by an informer, the defendant's car was
stopped and the defendant was searched. This
preliminary search revealed nothing, but the de-
fendant was arrested and taken to the police sta-
tion. At the police station, and after a more
thorough examination of the defendant's clothing,
illegal clearing house slips were discovered. These
slips formed the basis for the charge against him
and his subsequent conviction.
On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court held that
there was probable cause for the defendant's arrest
based upon the information supplied by the in-
former, coupled with the arresting police officer's
knowledge of the defendant's prior history. In
failing to draw the necessary distinction between
the informer privilege on the trial of the merits, as
distinguished from disclosure to test probable
cause, the court, in refusing disclosure, commented:
Only in an instance where an informer's iden-
tity would be beneficial and helpful to a de-
fendant is there any basis for requiring disclo-
sure .... The revelation of the name of the in-
former and the information supplied by him
would not alter the fact of defendant's guilt.
And a mere desire to test the credibility and
reliability of the informer is hardly a compel-
ling consideration in the circumstances nar-
rated.2e
2-Id. at 85, 97 S.E. 2d at 477.
214 Compare Boles with People v. Laird, supra note
187.
215 175 Ohio St. 73, 191 N.E. 2d 825 (1963), reversed
on otlier grounds, 379 U.S. 89 (1965).
216 Id. at 77, 191 N.E. 2d at 828.
South Dakota
In State v. Martin,"7 a prosecution for unlawful
transportation of intoxicating liquor, the trial
court refused to have the witness disclose the name
of the person who told him where the liquor could
be bought. The South Dakota Supreme Court sus-
tained the trial court stating that they were unable
to see in what manner the source of information
would have a bearing on the question of whether
or not the defendant unlawfully transported the
liquor, i.e. the defendant's guilt or innocence.
Tennessee
Tennessee has had occasion to deal with the
informer privilege in the probable cause area, but
the state's decisions appear to be in conflict. In
Smith v. State,m the police officers testified that
they had searched the defendant's car without a
warrant and solely upon information received by
an officer from an informer that the defendant was
bringing whiskey into a named place on the after-
noon in question. The Supreme Court of Tennessee
held:
[W]hen an officer seeks to justify an arrest
upon a charge made upon reasonable cause,
the officer should be required to reveal the
identity of the person making the charge as
well as the nature of the charge. The Court
has to pass upon the officer's justification, and
that justification is open to impeachment. A
defendant should not be bound by the officer's
statement that a charge had been made, and,
unless the source of the charge is ascertained,
neither its good faith nor reality could well be
challenged. An unscrupulous officer, upon a
fictitious story of a 'charge made', might vin-
dicate any arrest, however unlawful, if there
could be no further inquiry." 9
The authority of this decision, however, is
seriously impaired by its criticism in Simmons v.
State."' In Simmhons, a highway patrolman had,
upon information and without a warrant, stopped
and searched the defendant's automobile and
found therein some whiskey. On the trial for the
unlawful possession of whiskey, and in the ab-
sence of a jury, the patrolman testified that a
short time before he stopped the defendant's car,
an informer told him that a certain automobile,
-7 55 S.D. 594, 227 N.W. 66 (1929).
218 169 Tenn. 633, 90 S.W. 2d 523 (1936).
29 Id. at 637, 90 S.W. 2d at 524.
0 198 Tenn. 587, 281 S.W. 2d 487 (1955).
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describing it, would be traveling along the high-
way in question (apparently transporting illegal
whiskey). On appeal, the defense contended that
the police officer upon request (there was a request
for the informer's name at the trial) must be re-
quired by the trial court to disclose the name of
the informant as part of the proof of "reasonable
cause."
On the first hearing of the case, the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that it was in the discretion
of the trial court whether to require disclosure of
the name of the informant in its determination as
to whether there was "reasonable ground" for a
belief that a felony was about to be committed.
On petition for rehearing, it was again urged by
the defense that prior opinions of the court, in-
cluding Smith, required disclosure of the informer's
name. The court declined to change its previous
ruling, resting its decision on the ground that in
view of the provisions of its Code-that an officer is
privileged to arrest "when the person has com-
mitted a felony, though not in his presence,"--the
proper rule is to the effect, "that it is a discretion-
ary matter with the trial judge as to whether or
not he requires the officer to give the name of the
informant when testifying about this arrest in
the absence of the jury."m
Texas
The informer privilege at this time appears to
be absolute in Texas. In Bridges v. State,= the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that "an
Officer is not required to reveal the name of the
person from whom he receives information upon
which he bases his right to arrest or search upon
n1 Id. at 598, 281 S.W. 2d at 492. It was further stated
that the court, in Smith, overlooked the provisions in
the Code referred to in the text, and that the Smith
decision was written by a court consisting of different
personnel from that now.
But, only one year prior, the court in Shields v. State,
197 Tenn. 83, 270 S.W. 2d 367 (1954), apparently
concurred in the Smith opinion. The question in Shields
was unique, in that a police officer, as defendant in a
criminal trial, tried to defend his firing of a pistol, shot
into an automobile, on the theory that he had informa-
tion that the automobile owner was transporting illegal
whiskey [a felony in Tennessee]. The State objected to
the officer's telling what information he received tojustify his belief that the automobile contained illegal
whiskey until he disclosed the name of the informant.
The trial court sustained the State's objection, requiring
disclosure of the informant prior to permitting the
defendant detailing the facts leading up to the alleged
offense. This ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court,
holding that the question was controlled by the ruling
in Smith.
2 166 Tex. Cr. 556, 316 S.W. 2d 757 (1958).
probable cause." In Bridges, police officers re-
ceived information from an informant that the
defendant was going to deliver heroin in a certain
manner, at a certain place. The police officers went
to the designated area, and upon arriving, saw
the defendant place a gum wrapper in his mouth.
The court held that under these circumstances the
police officer had sufficient reason to believe that
the defendant possessed a narcotic drug and was
committing a felony in his presence. Subsequent
Texas cases accept the rule enunciated in Bridges
as absoluteY
4
In Campbell v. State,n5 the defendant was con-
victed of an unlawful sale of narcotic drugs to a
police officer. The officer was introduced to the
defendant by the informer, but it does not appear
from the facts whether the informant was present
when the alleged sale took place. The court cited
Bridges, a probable cause situation, in holding
flatly that "an officer is not required to name his
informer."26
However, the recent decision of Artell v. Texas,m
is interesting to note at least for the language used
by the court. In Artell, a conviction for possession
of a weapon, the court held that an officer who
received information, later verified, from one
believed a reliable informant could search without
warrant. The court further commented that,
"the court did not err in declining to require...
[the officer] to name his informer. This is especially
so since there is no showing that the informant
took any material part in bringing about the
offense, was present when it occurred or might be
a material witness as to whether or not accused
committed the offense."s
2id. at 559, 316 S.W. 2d at 760.
2 Sikes v. State, 169 Tex. Cr. 443, 334 S.W. 2d 440
(1960); Arredondo v. State, 168 Tex. Cr. 110, 324 S.W.
2d 217 (1959).
25 168 Tex. Crim. 520, 329 S.W. 2d 875 (1959).
n26 Id. at 521, 329 S.W. 2d at 877. Cf. Brown v. State,
135 Tex. Crim. 394, 120 S.W. 2d 1057 (1938). In Brown,
a prosecution for the sale of whiskey in a dry area, the
court upheld the trial court's refusal to require the
state's witness [who worked for the State Liquor Control
Board] to disclose the identity of the party who accom-
panied the witness at the time the witness made a
purchase of whiskey from the accused. The court held
that the accompanying party was merely a person who
pointed out to the witness where liquor could be found,
and could see no benefit from divulging his name.
7 372 S.W. 2d 944 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951
(1963).
218 372 S.W. 2d at 945. See Phillips v. State, 168 Tex.
Cr. 463, 328 S.W. 2d 873 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
839 (1961), where the court held that a police officer is
not required to disclose the name of an allegedly reliable
informer, upon whose information the officer relies in his




Webb v. Comrnonwealth,m was a prosecution for
a violation of the state's prohibition act. The
Virginia Supreme Court upheld, on public policy
considerations, the trial court's refusal to compel
the arresting officer to disclose the name of the
informant who gave him information which led to
the issuance of a search warrant to search the
outbuilding of the accused. It appears, however,
that the legality of the search was never in issue.
Washington
In Washington, the informer privilege, and its
disclosure aspects, both in the probable cause and
trial of the merits area, appear to be largely dis-
cretionary with the trial judge. The latest Wash-
ington Supreme Court ruling, State v. Driscoll,2°
a prosecution for burglary, held that the trial
court did not err in refusing to require a witness
to disclose the identity of an alleged police in-
former, where, at the time of the request and
ruling thereon, the defendant had not advised the
court of his proposed defense of entrapment or
otherwise enlighten the court as to the materiality
or relevancy of the desired disclosure. The court
adopted the proposition that the accused is re-
quired at the time that he seeks disclosure to show
that the circumstances justify an exception to the
privilege.
The Driscoll decision is in accord with an earlier
ruling of the Washington Supreme Court, State v.
Hull.21 Hull was also a prosecution for burglary,
the defense being entrapment The court held that
whether or not disclosure would be required is
largely discretionary with the trial judge, and its
ruling will not ordinarily be disturbed.
The earliest informer privilege case, State v.
Kittle,m was an appeal from a conviction for
unlawful possession of liquor, the legality of the
search being the prime issue. The court pointed
out that the evidence showed reasonable cause for
the arrest. The court held that the reputation of
the defendant, the information given to the sheriff,
and the entry of the defendant into the premises
from a moving vehicle at night carrying a sack, all
tended to support the view that a crime was com-
mitted in the officer's presence. The court con-
cluded that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
137 Va. 833, 120 S.E. 155 (1923).
2061 W.2d 533, 379 P.2d 206 (1963).
23 189 Wash. 174, 64 P.2d 83 (1937).
= 137 Wash. 173, 241 P. 962 (1926).
tion in refusing to require the sheriff to disclose
the source of information upon which he acted
since the source was wholly immaterial to the
issue involved.
West Virginia
In State v. Paun,m the defendant was convicted
of ualawfully selling liquor to an officer. The ex-
planation given by the officer for attempting to
purchase liquor from the defendant was that he
had information of whiskey being sold in the pool
room. This statement was the only connection
between the informer and the transaction charged.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held
that the defendant could not complain that he
was not permitted to cross-examine the officer as to
his source of information since "the proper execu-
tion of the law in detecting criminals ordinarily
forbids requiring officers to disclose informants of
crime.... No reason appears for taking this case
out of the general rule. 2
4
CONCLUSION
Any defense of the informer privilege must
unquestionably accept the view that the informant
is vital in society's constant effort to combat
crime. Once this view is accepted, the assured
anonymity of the informant appears as the only
effective method of preserving the informant
system and of protecting those individuals who
have participated in the process.
But, at times, fundamental concepts of fairness
may necessitate the disclosure of the informant.
The principal pronouncement in Roviaro, that the
informer privilege is not absolute but is subject to
a balancing test, has met with begrudging ac-
ceptance. This dissatisfaction has gone far in con-
fusing and disregarding the difference between the
standards applicable when the informer privilege
is invoked on guilt or innocence issues, as distin-
guished from when probable cause is the factor to
be determined. There is a large distinction between
the two things (guilt and probable cause) as well
as a difference between the rules of evidence re-
quired to establish them.
The principle guiding disclosure at trial should
depend upon the significance of the informant's
testimony as bearing upon the accused's guilt or
innocence. The fact that an informant is a par-
ticipant in the crime charged should be only one
=a 109 W.Va. 606, 155 S.E. 656 (1930).
29 Id. at 608, 155 S.E. at 657.
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relevant factor in this determination. More par-
ticularly, the informer privilege should yield where
the informant's identity is so essential to the
accused's defense as to outweigh the public interest
involved in protecting his identity.
There is no tidy formula for determining when
the privilege must yield when probable cause is in
issue. Clearly, however, if probable cause exists
independent of the confidential communication,
there is no need to disclose the informant's iden-
tity, for in such a case his identity is immaterial.
The clue to the problem, when the confidential
communication is a necessary ingredient of prob-
able cause, may lie in the purpose for which the
defense seeks disclosure. Aside from the tactical
reason of hoping that the Government will dismiss
the charge rather than disclose the informant, the
defendant may seek disclosure for any of three
purposes.
(1) To test the existence of the informant.
(2) To ascertain whether the information given
to the police officer was materially different
than that sworn to by the officer either in
his affidavit for a warrant or at the hearing
to suppress.
(3) To determine if the informant is reliable.
The first and second purpose involve the credi-
bility of the officer, and whether he has misrepre-
sented to the court either the existence of the in-
formant, or the recitation of the facts the inform-
ant has told him. It would seem sufficient to satisfy
these purposes that a judicial officer has passed
upon the credibility of the police officer. If the
magistrate doubts the officer's credibility he may
require that the informant be identified or even
produced.
The third purpose for which a defendant may
seek disclosure presents a more difficult but not
insurmountable problem. Certainly, probable
cause cannot be satisfied on the mere naked con-
clusionary statement by the officer that the in-
formant was reliable. The officer must disclose
some of the underlying factors which prompted
him to conclude that the informant was reliable
and his information credible. The Government
should be required to disclose enough of these
underlying factors so as to satisfy the magistrate,
that based upon the evidence produced in open
court, (such evidence being subject to proper
examination) the information received was from a
reliable source. If these standards are accepted,
the benefit the public derives from the informer
privilege can be maintained without significant
diminution of the fourth amendment.
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